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Abstract 
Institutional Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence From Canada 
Michael Farrell 
This study examines the relationship between institutional ownership and firm 
performance using a sample of 567 Canadian firms  in 2011. The focus on the Canadian 
firms provides additional insight towards the topic of institutional ownership as a 
remedial measure towards agency problems, since Canada has shared legal traditions 
with the United States, but has ownership concentration more comparable to levels in 
Western Europe and Asia. A distinguishing feature of this study's analysis involves the 
consideration of institutional investor by type as well as the inclusion of the number of 
such investors as a measure of ownership.  
The effects of institutional ownership on  performance measures Tobin's Q, Industry-
Adjusted Tobin's Q, and  Return on Assets are estimated using ordinary least squares 
(OLS) and two-stage least squares (2SLS) methodology, where the latter is employed to 
offset the endogeneity bias to which the OLS method is susceptible. Although several 
relationships emerged between institutional ownership levels and measures of Tobin's Q 
in the OLS regression, only a negative relationship between both the percentage and the 
number of insurance company investors, was observed to be significant once estimated 
simultaneously under the 2 SLS method. For all measures of performance, Hausman tests 
reveal that OLS results are biased in multiple instances; meaningful interpretation must 
rely on the 2 SLS results.  
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1 Introduction 
Corporate value is destroyed by agency problems and conflicts of interest between 
providers of capital and the firm's decision makers. With an increase in the level of 
institutional investment worldwide, its role within corporate governance has gained 
interest as a prospective mechanism to reduce agency costs.  
This study examines the relation between institutional ownership and firm performance 
measured by Tobin's Q and return on assets (ROA) using a sample of 567 Canadian firms  
in 2011. In light of research on U.S. firms, which has produced mixed results, a Canadian 
study on this topic allows for further understanding of the role institutional investors play 
in reducing agency costs. The two countries differ substantially, in terms of corporate 
ownership structures, concentration of firms in Canada in the natural resources sector 
compared to the U.S., a great number of family firms in Canada and the prevalence of 
dual class share structures, although both countries share a legal tradition derived from 
English common-law (La Porta et al., 1997, La Porta et al., 1999). Corporate ownership 
in Canada is characteristically more concentrated than in the United States and is more in 
line with ownership structures observed in Western Europe and East Asia, where widely 
held firms account for approximately 20% of the population
1
 (Claessens et al 2000, 
Faccio and Lang 2002, Attig and Gadhoum 2003).  
Furthermore, a significant presence of family ownership among Canadian firms has 
attracted attention from observers concerned that such structures harbour nepotism to the 
detriment of economic development (Mork et al., 1998).   Studies devoted to the 
                                                          
1
 Ownership concentration in the United States is generally observed to be dispersed with 50% -80% of 
firms widely held at the 10% threshold. (La Porta et al 1999) Gadhoum et al (2005) estimates the 
percentage of widely held firms to be 40% at the 10% threshold. 
2 
 
relationship between family ownership and firm performance have produced mixed 
results, but none of which show family ownership to be directly detrimental to firm value. 
King and Santor (2008) conclude that control enhancing mechanisms (dual class shares 
and pyramid structures) which are more common among family firms lower firm 
performance. However, Pukthuaunthong et al. (2012) observe such control enhancing 
mechanisms increase firm value. Furthermore, the authors find that large levels of family 
ownership only erode a value premium which is created by their presence. 
This study employs cross-sectional regressions using ordinary least squares (OLS) and 
two-stage least squares (2 SLS) methodology. Hausman (1978)  tests reject the null 
hypothesis that OLS results are unbiased for Q, Industry-Adjusted Q, and ROA. 
Although institutional ownership as a general category is not significant in explaining any 
measure of performance in the 2 SLS model, insurance company ownership is 
significantly negative in explaining industry-adjusted Tobin's Q. This finding suggests 
that insurance companies add to agency problems due to their inability to monitor 
management which may result from auxiliary business ties (Brickley et al., 1988). 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the 
literature on multiple agency problems, as well as mechanisms to reduce such problems, 
specifically institutional investors as blockholders. Section 3 provides as description of 
the OLS and 2SLS methodologies. Section 4 introduces the data on which the analysis is 
conducted. Section 5 presents the results and interpretation. Section 6 concludes.  
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2 Literature Review 
2.1 Agency Costs 
In traditional microeconomic theory, efficient resource allocation is achieved through 
markets which provide a good until its marginal benefit equals its marginal cost. In 
practice, many economic decisions are made internally at the firm level, and do not 
involve market mechanisms directly (Coase, 1938). In such cases, the allocation of 
capital is determined by managers who often act as agents on behalf of the firm's owners. 
When a firm is not owner-managed, the manager does not bear the full economic 
consequences of his decisions, and is therefore not incentivized to equate the firm's 
marginal cost with marginal benefit. This is a manifestation of the classic principal-agent 
problem, in which the agent is able to extract wealth at the expense of the principal 
(Bearle and Means, 1932). The magnitude of this problem is inversely related to the 
effective equity stake a manager holds in the firm (Jensen and Meckling,  1976). The 
lower a manager's ownership interest in a firm, the greater is the incentive for the 
manager to engage in self-serving behaviour to the detriment of firm value, as he bears 
less of the costs. Since large corporations are not entirely owner-managed, agency 
relationships (and costs) have attracted much attention in the economic literature, 
particularly over the past four decades.  
While some value-loss may be attributable to agency, establishing a principal-agency  is a 
solution to a problem, where the principal is unable to act on his own behalf with the 
same efficacy as the hired agent (White, 1985). The agency problem, therefore exists on 
the margin independent of the value added from the agency relationship. The magnitude 
4 
 
of the agency problem is the difference in wealth to the principal between the existing 
principal-agent scenario and a hypothetical principal-agent scenario where the agent 
acted as if he were facing the entire consequences from his decisions which are actually 
borne by the principals (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This conception of the agency 
problem implies that its costs will always be positive, regardless of the value initially 
added by the principal-agent relationship.  
More generally, agency costs need not be limited to the relationship between managers 
and stockholders. Agency relationships exist at almost every level of an organization; 
where in one context a manager is an agent to the board of directors and the shareholders, 
he is also a principal to his subordinates. For an organization to maximize its value, it 
must overcome the agency problems which arise from a large network of competing 
interests (Shapiro, 2005). Furthermore, shareholders do not necessarily form a 
homogenous group. In the way that managers have an incentive to extract wealth from 
the firm, large shareholders have a similar motivation to do the same, as they do not bear 
the full costs of particular policies, but may bear a disproportional benefit to their own 
welfare (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
Villalonga and Amit (2006) consider agency costs in two categories based on potential 
conflicts between owners and managers (Agency Cost I), and conflicts among owners 
(Agency Cost II). This is a departure from the bulk of the literature which from the onset 
of the work of Bearle and Means (1932), has focused primarily on Agency Cost I, with 
the image of a widely held firm considered to be the prevalent form of corporate 
ownership structure. La Porta et al. (1999) find that outside of the United States and the 
United Kingdom, the widely held firm is much less ubiquitous, and that family owned 
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firms make up a substantial portion of the market, up to 50% of medium and 30% of 
large-sized companies in Canada in particular. Remediating agency problems in the 
Canadian context must therefore consider both the owner-manager, and the inter-owner 
conflicts of interest. 
2.2 Agency Cost I: The Owner-Manager Conflict 
The mechanisms assumed to mitigate the manager-owner conflict rely on reducing the 
manager's discretion, or in the case of executive compensation and insider shareholdings, 
provide economic incentives which are intended to align decisions with shareholder 
welfare. Manager discretion is limited by two broad categories: the threat of dismissal 
and the partial deprivation of discretion over funds. A CEO can be removed from office 
by the board of directors, elected by the shareholders. Outside directors, large block 
holders, including institutional investors, and a market for managerial labour theoretically 
constrain the behaviour of management resulting from their ability to select the CEO 
(Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996). 
The reduction of free cash flow entrusted to management may diminish the agency 
problem, since fewer value destroying actions are possible (Jensen, 1986). This is 
achieved through dividend and debt policy, where the firm pledges to repay a specific 
amount to its stakeholders on an ongoing basis (Jensen, 1986, Grossman and Hart, 1982). 
In the case of debt, restrictions are stricter as a failure to repay will have legal 
ramifications, resulting in the loss of certain control rights from the borrowing firm to the 
lender, potentially forcing bankruptcy on the firm  (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In 
addition, dividends and debt repayment policies are believed to lower agency costs due to 
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the higher scrutiny they attract from the capital markets (Rozeff, 1982, Easterbrook, 
1984). 
On the incentive side, measures may be taken to make the manager's personal wealth 
more sensitive to the firm's performance. This may be achieved through insider stock-
ownership, stock options-based compensation, performance-based bonuses, and an 
explicit threat of dismissal if income is low (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Fama, 1980). 
Under such schemes, a manager is less likely to engage in value destroying projects, 
since the private benefits to be reaped from such activities will be at least partially offset 
by a loss in performance-based compensation (Schleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
The mechanisms intended to reduce agency costs are not without particular trade-offs. 
The incentive schemes described above, although specific and designed to mitigate the 
manager-owner conflict, are incomplete; they do not prescribe the manager's 
remuneration according to every variable, measurable and immeasurable, which 
determine performance. Since complete contracts are not feasible, agency problems will 
persist and may even be amplified through such a system (Schleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
Managers, instead of promoting stable growth, may "manipulate accounting numbers and 
investment policy to increase their pay" (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, p. 745). This is 
confirmed by Yermack (1997), who finds that managers time the redemption of their 
stock option grants according to future company specific news, thereby circumventing 
the intended disciplinary objectives of their performance based compensation. 
Reducing free cash flow available to managers through dividend policy and increased 
leverage has drawbacks when financing value creating projects, as raising outside funds 
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is more expensive than reinvesting funds internally, due to transactions costs. With 
respect to dividends, there are typically taxes to be paid by investors upon their reception; 
if the dividends were to go to the shareholders and be immediately reinvested in a new 
equity issuance, the firm would lose the value of the taxes. Rozeff (1982) provides a 
model where the firm selects an optimal dividend payout which minimizes the total of 
agency and transaction costs. For the firm's debt policy, although a commitment to repay 
a loan at a fixed rate over time reduces agency problems associated with free cash flow, it 
creates an agency problem between the equity stakeholders and the bondholders (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). In this instance, equity holders will prefer a higher level of risk, 
which increases the expected value of the firm's equity. This results in an increase in the 
risk of default, which lowers the value of the firm's debt.  The possibility of such a 
transfer of wealth from debt holders to equity holders poses an additional agency 
problem, which raises the cost of debt with increases in leverage. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) model the firm's optimal level of debt, which minimizes total agency costs. 
When ownership is dispersed among many shareholders with small levels of wealth 
invested in any individual firm, a free-rider problem exists where no one is incentivized 
to oversee the quality of management (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Monitoring by the 
company's large shareholders and outside members of board of directors reduces the 
agency problem between the managers and the owners, but may create agency problems 
of its own, as there is no one to monitor the monitors (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986, 
Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996). Large investors may use the corporation as a tool to extract 
private benefits from minority shareholders (Schleifer and Vishny, 1997). The reduction 
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in firm value which rises from this inter-owner conflict is referred to as Agency Cost II 
(Amit and Villalonga, 2006), discussed next.  
2.3 Agency Cost II: The Inter-Owner Conflict and Family Ownership 
In countries with strong investor protections, such as in much of Western Europe, the 
United States, and Canada, controlling shareholders are constrained in their ability to 
expropriate, as the actions of the firm may be subject to litigation by oppressed 
stakeholders. Minority shareholders may  challenge the decisions of management in court 
or oblige the corporation to repurchase their shares when they disagree with fundamental 
decisions, such as major acquisitions or asset sales (La Porta et al., 1998). To the extent 
that the legal system is unable to resolve such conflicts, the agency problem among 
owners persists. Barclay and Holderness (1989, 1992), who use American data, show that 
controlling blocks trade at a premium to post trade minority shares; even where minority 
shareholder rights are considered to be well-protected, control is valued. In countries with 
weaker investor protection, agency costs result in substantially smaller equity markets 
with higher control premiums (Zingales, 1994, Barca, 1995, Pagano et al., 1995, La Porta 
et al., 1997). 
The occurrence of Agency Cost II is additionally related to the cash flow rights of the 
controlling shareholder. When a shareholder controls more than 50% of the shares of 
which all have equal voting rights, the firm's ownership is said to have a controlled 
structure (CS) (Bebchuck et al., 2000). Under the controlled structure, the dominant 
shareholder is entrenched, but faces the consequences of his decisions through the value 
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effects on his shareholdings (Bebchuck et al., 2000). This curtails the incentive to 
expropriate value from the minority shareholders, but does not eliminate it entirely. 
The firm's ownership can be modified from a controlled structure (CS) to a controlled 
minority structure (CMS) by separating control from ownership via pyramid or cross-
ownership schemes, or by simply issuing differential voting shares (Bebchuck et al., 
2000). With a small minority of cash flow rights, a shareholder can hold a controlling 
position in the firm. This presents a more insidious opportunity for the controlling 
shareholder, compared with the controlled structure, as, "CMS firms can externalize 
progressively more of the costs of their moral hazard and [...] the agency costs of CMS 
firms can increase at a sharply increasing rate as a result" (Bebchuck et al., 2000 page 
301). In the case of dual class equity, ownership structure, even without the majority of 
voting rights, dominant holders of voting shares are largely insulated from takeovers, as 
such events are intrinsically more difficult among companies with dual class shares (Hart, 
1988). 
2.4 Agency Costs Within Family Firms 
Minority shareholders of controlled family firms are perceived to face a greater risk of 
expropriation as such expropriation may be accomplished more covertly and efficiently 
by families compared to other types of controlling block holders (Demsetz and Lehn, 
1985). This may take the form of special dividends, excessive compensation for family 
members, and related party transactions (De Angelo and De Angelo, 2000).  In addition, 
family nepotism, which can harbour mediocre management (Morck et al., 1998), is a 
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manifestation of one of the most costly forms of agency problems (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997).  
Despite the costs associated with family ownership, the evidence of family ownership's 
effect on firm performance has been mixed. Claessens et al. (2002) find that family 
ownership increases Tobin's Q, but this is counteracted when control augmentation 
features are used. Likewise Maury (2006) reaches a similar conclusion, only for firms 
actively controlled by families. Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Villalonga and Amit 
(2006) document founder premiums for Tobin's Q, but these effects are offset either by 
descendent CEOs, control premiums, or lack of independent members on the board of 
directors. Holderness and Sheehan (1988) found family firms to have lower Tobin's Q 
without considering control enhancement tactics.  
Canadian studies have produced similar results: King and Santor (2008) observe Tobin's 
Q to be on par for family firms when compared to their widely held counterparts, 
although value was destroyed when control exceeded ownership rights. Pukthuanthong et 
al. (2013) find that Tobin's Q is higher for family firms and is increased by control 
enhancing mechanisms. In addition, Ben-Amar and Andre (2006) document higher 
abnormal returns to family firms who are bidders in mergers and acquisitions activities.  
On the whole, the evidence suggests that families do expropriate value, particularly when 
control enhancement features are used. Agency cost II that families bring to corporations 
is at least partially offset by their role in mitigating agency cost I, both by direct 
monitoring and participation in management. Gomez-Mejia et al. (2001) find that family 
ownership is associated with higher levels of managerial entrenchment. This implies that 
11 
 
at a certain point, the distinction between agency costs I and II become nuanced, as large 
shareholders and management can be one and the same. This point is reinforced by 
Anderson and Reeb (2003) who find that family firms use less incentive based pay or 
outside block holders to curtail management; there is less need to constrain management 
when it is also a significant shareholder.  
2.5 Incentives to Reduce Agency Costs 
Managers have an incentive to reduce agency costs, as these costs are capitalized into the 
price at which new equity is issued. This implies that from the first stage of accepting 
outside investment, the initial entrepreneur-manager will use constraints to bind himself 
from expropriating investor wealth, so as to maximize his total wealth which depends on 
his equity stake and total market value of the firm  (Jensen and Meckling 1976).  In 
corporations, managers share a similar incentive to lower agency costs, in order to avoid 
the problems associated with an underperforming stock value. Such problems include a 
higher cost of capital, a higher risk of being taken-over, and a higher risk of being 
personally ousted as manager.  
A firm may benefit from a variety of mechanisms which contribute in the reduction of 
agency costs: the use of outside directors, debt policy, dividend policy, executive 
compensation structure, insider shareholdings, the market for corporate control (take-
overs), the managerial labour market, large block holders, and institutional investors 
(Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996, Jensen, 1986, others).  Of these mechanisms, only board 
composition, capital structure, dividend payout, executive compensation, and insider 
shareholdings are within the control of the firm's management. If their implementation is 
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made optimally, these mechanisms are used until their marginal benefit equals their 
marginal cost; their contribution to firm performance is unobservable in a cross-sectional 
regression (Demsetz, 1983, Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). Furthermore, combined with the 
market for managerial labour, the internally-controlled mechanisms treat exclusively the 
manager-owner conflict (Agency Cost I), while the remaining mechanisms, block holders 
and institutional investors, combat both Agency Cost I and Agency Cost II. As outsider 
ownership stakes are outside the control of management, they are selected to maximize 
not firm value, but the wealth of the respective owners. As a result, systematic variations 
in their usage may be associated with an observable change in firm value, even when all 
decisions are made optimally (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996).  
This assessment is slightly different from that of Demsetz and Lehn (1985), who contend 
that all mechanisms are chosen optimally by the market, based on unobserved firm 
heterogeneity,  such that no systematic variation will be associated with firm value. This 
implies that the positive externalities brought on by external block holders, through 
monitoring for example, will be captured by these same block holders, such that their 
marginal contribution to firm performance is offset by their marginal cost; the value they 
generate is equal to the value they expropriate. The matter of whether external block 
holders may systematically affect firm performance is therefore a question of how 
efficiently do they create and internalize positive externalities on the firm.  
  
13 
 
2.6 Institutional and Blockholder Ownership as a Mechanism to Combat Agency 
Problems 
The influence of large block holders within corporate governance has given rise to a 
subtopic of research which focuses on institutions as an agency cost reduction 
mechanism. This has attracted more attention since the late 1980s due to a decline in 
take-over activity and a continued rise in institutional ownership around the world 
(Davis, 2002).  
Block holders are considered to be important components of corporate governance due to 
their influence both within the firm and the market. Grossman and Hart (1980) model the 
free-rider problem among atomistic shareholders as a phenomenon which thwarts 
takeover attempts, since the existing shareholders will expect to be compensated for the 
value created by the prospective "raider".  Since large shareholders are in a position to 
assume the value gained from takeover on their current shares, they are more likely to 
spur such value enhancing transactions. Here, the simple prospect of a takeover will add 
value, as the market for capital control is strengthened. 
Stulz (1988) models a curvilinear relationship between insider ownership level and firm 
value. Firm value is seen to be a function of the premium paid on the control block and 
the probability of such a transaction taking place. The greater the control block, the 
greater the premium the bidder is willing to pay. The value brought by the size of the 
control block is bounded since the probability of such a takeover decreases with the size 
of the block holder's position. 
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Shleifer and Vishny (1986) take the perspective of the large block holder's incentive to 
monitor management. Again, a free-rider problem is overcome as greater monitoring 
takes place as the block holder's ownership stake increases. In this model, monitoring 
complements the takeover mechanism, as other less costly strategies, such as 
"jawboning", are less effective. In addition to scale economies in monitoring, large 
shareholders can exercise their legal rights more effectively than small shareholders, 
thereby providing additional restrain on managerial discretion and agency costs (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997). 
2.7 Empirical Evidence 
Numerous studies have found a positive abnormal return associated with outsiders 
acquiring large blocks of equity: (Mikkelson and Ruback (1985), Sheehan (1985), and 
Barclay and Holderness (1990)). In addition, Wruck (1989) finds a positive abnormal 
return associated with private equity sales, despite a negative abnormal return on public 
equity offerings. These findings suggest that ownership concentration creates value 
within the market. Block holders are believed to improve efficiency by increasing future 
or immediate cash flows to equity holders (Holderness, 2003).  
Several studies which have examined the relationship between ownership structure and 
firm performance outside the context of market based transactions, found little evidence 
that simple ownership concentration adds value. McConnell and Servaes (1990) 
determine outside block holdings to be insignificant in explaining Tobin's Q, however 
they observe a significant relationship between insider ownership and Tobin's Q which 
peaks between 40 and 50%. These results differ from Morck et al. (1988), who determine 
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insider ownership to increase value up until the 5% level. Despite the value added from 
executive stock holdings, Mehran (1995) finds no relationship between outside block 
holdings and firm value.  Holderness and Sheehan (1988) observe no difference in 
Tobin's Q between widely held and majority owned firm. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) find 
no relationship between accounting returns and equity concentration using a variety of 
measures. A number of studies which have specified block ownership to terms as narrow 
as institutional investors as a broad group, have neither found significant associations 
with firm performance (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996, Crasswell et al., 1997, Sundarurthy 
et al 2005, Rose, 2007). 
The failure of these studies to observe the effects of institutional ownership on firm 
performance may be due to the heterogeneity of institutional investors, who may be either 
pressure-sensitive or pressure-resistant to the objectives of management (Brickley et al., 
1988). Similarly, Pound (1988) postulates three types of institutional investor incentives: 
efficient monitoring, conflict of interest, and strategic alignment.  
Only the efficient monitoring hypothesis implies that institutional ownership will 
improve performance, due to its greater size and expertise to overcome the free-rider 
problem. The requirement to monitor is a by-product of the relatively large positions held 
by institutions which prevent a costless exit (Aoki, 1984, Lowenstein, 1988, Maug, 
1988). Despite such costs, Parrino et al. (2003) observe that institutions are more likely to 
liquidate their positions if dividends are cut. 
The conflict of interest and strategic alignment hypotheses suggest that institutions will 
work to the detriment of minority shareholders, and resulting in lower firm performance. 
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The strategic alignment hypothesis is related to "pressure-sensitivity" described by 
Brickley et al. (1988): institutions enhance the agency problem from management so that 
they may be compensated by means outside their capacity as shareholders. This may 
include personal business connections (Jacobs, 1991). The conflict of interest motive 
amounts to an additional agency cost (Agency Cost II), as institutions may attempt to 
align the firm's strategy not entirely with value maximization, but with a secondary 
objective. Institutional investor myopia, where institutions are seen to prefer short term 
profits to the detriment of long term growth, is claimed to be an example of such a 
conflict of interest, although this remains unresolved in the literature (Graves, 1988, 
Hansen and Hill, 1991).  
Given the range of objectives held by the various institutional investors, studies which 
have analyzed their impact on firm performance through finer classifications have 
yielded stronger results. Chaganti and Damanpour (1991) observe higher ROE and ROA 
among firms with greater outside institutional investors, as well as a lower debt to total 
capital ratio, which implies that institutional ownership at least partially substitutes for 
debt as an agency control mechanism. Cornett et al. (2003) observe pressure resistant 
institutions to improve firm operating cash flow, while pressure sensitive institutions are 
ineffective. Bhattacharya and Graham (2007) determine pressure sensitive institutions to 
have a worse impact on firm performance than pressure resistant institutions, although 
both were negative. In addition, Woodlke (2002) finds private pensions increase Tobin's 
Q, while public pensions lower Q. In order to assess an underlying relationship between 
the institutional investor and firm performance, Elyasiani and Jia (2010) determine that 
the stability of institutional ownership significantly increases the firm's Tobin's Q. From 
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this, it would appear that the identity of the owner is secondary to the role such an 
investor plays within the governance of the firm; longer term business connections likely 
foster  information sharing and monitoring (Porter, 1992). 
An additional consideration, particularly in the Canadian context, is the effect of 
institutional ownership as a mechanism to combat the agency problem which arises from 
large family ownership. Maury and Prajuste (2005) observe in Finland, where only 25% 
of firms are widely held, that Tobin's Q increases as the voting rights distribution among 
block holders becomes more equal. This suggests that institutional investors may 
contribute to agency cost reduction in the context of a family controlled business, which 
has supposedly eliminated the principle agent problem, agency cost I. Besides forming 
coalitions to affect policy (Davis, 2002), institutions may induce greater governance by 
making the firm's management more responsible to the market. This may be achieved by 
institutional trading, which embeds more future information into stock prices (Jimbalvo 
et al., 2002), lowers information asymmetry (Aghion et al., 2005, Elyasiani and Jia, 
2010), and lowers volatility in non dividend-paying stocks (Rubin and Smith, 2009). As 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) note that institutions "lever-up" investor legal protection due 
to their size and expertise, the disciplinary power of the market is also levered-up due to 
the scrutiny and information sharing brought about by institutional investors.  
3 Methodology 
3.1 Purpose of Regression Models 
The principal  hypothesis of this study is that ownership structure, specifically 
institutional ownership,  contributes to firm performance. This is first measured through a 
18 
 
cross-sectional regression estimated using the ordinary least squares (OLS) methodology. 
Since ownership structure is an endogenous outcome of a series of factors which includes 
firm performance,  an OLS regression of performance on ownership structure risks 
estimating parameters which are biased and inconsistent
2
 (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). A 
simultaneous equations model, using the method of two-stage least squares (2 SLS) is 
employed in order to avoid the potential estimation bias. This is achieved by regressing 
institutional ownership on instrumental variables which are exogenous to the system in 
the first stage, thereby ensuring that the measure of institutional ownership is 
uncorrelated to the regression's error terms in the second stage.  
The use of a 2SLS model comes with a trade-off as the OLS parameter estimates have 
smaller standard errors and are therefore more efficient when no bias or inconsistency is 
present. The absence of a statistically significant relationship in a 2SLS model may result 
from two possibilities when such a relationship is observed with statistical significance 
with the OLS model: the OLS estimates may be biased and inconsistent, or the 2SLS may 
be unable to affirm a true relationship with statistical significance due to its lack of 
efficiency. In order to assess the suitability of the OLS and 2SLS results, Hausman 
(1978) tests are conducted to detect the potential of a bias in the OLS parameter 
estimates.  
  
                                                          
2
 An estimate is considered biased and inconsistent when its expected value is neither equal to nor 
converges to the true value of the parameter estimated. In the case of an endogenous predictor variable, 
due to a potential omitted variable, a parameter estimate is biased and inconsistent when it is correlated 
with the regression's error term. 
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3.2 The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Model: 
The relationship between firm performance and ownership structure is estimated using 
the following cross-sectional OLS model: 
Yi = α + β' Xi + γ' GICi + δ' OWNi + εi    (1) 
where Yi is a measure of performance (Q, GIC-Adjusted Q, or ROA). Xi is a vector of 
control variables described in Table 4 , GICi is a vector of dummy variables  to control 
for industry, and OWNi contains the measures of ownership either as a total percentage or 
as a count of the number of institutional and family owners.  εi is a mean zero error term. 
The number of institutional owners is considered since Cornett et al. (2003) observed a 
positive relationship between the natural logarithm of pressure insensitive institutional 
owners and operating cash flow returns. This study considers the number of institutional 
and family owners without transformations since ownership counts are limited to 10 per 
firm; the possible effects of diminishing marginal contributions from ownership over this 
interval are not considered.   
3.3 The Two-Stage Least Squares (2 SLS) Model: 
Due to a potential bias in the OLS parameter estimates, performance is explained with 
institutional ownership modelled endogenously within the following simultaneous 
equations framework: 
Yi = α + β' Xi + γ' GICi + δ owni + εi   (2) 
 owni = a + B' Zi + c Yi + ei   (3) 
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where Yi, Xi, GICi and εi are defined as in equation (1). The endogenous variable, owni, 
represents the level of institutional ownership either as a number or as a percentage. This 
differs slightly from OWNi in equation (1) which stands as a vector for multiple 
ownership levels regressed together.
3
  Zi is a vector containing measures for size, 
leverage, block holder wedge,  as well as dummy variables for dividend, cross-listing and 
Quebec. Family and industrial levels of ownership are measured in percentages.
4
  GICi is 
a vector of dummy variables as a control for industry.
5
 Quebec is selected as a dummy 
variable to explain ownership as there exists a distinct ownership pattern in the province 
(Attig and Gadhoum 2003). Block holder wedge is a measure of excess control rights 
among shareholders with an ownership stake larger than 10%.  
The 2 SLS system mitigates the estimation biases which may result from the endogenous 
relation between ownership and performance by estimating these variables in the first 
stage using exogenous instruments: 
 Vi = k + Φ' Ii + μi   (4) 
where Vi is an estimated variable in the first stage of the two-stage least squares 
procedure, either   i or    i. Ii represents a vector of instruments: ln(assets), leverage, 
block holder wedge, family percent ownership, industrial firm percent ownership, 
                                                          
3
 It is possible to regress several ownership variables in a first stage of a 2 SLS procedure and use them as 
explanatory variables in a second stage. This was not conducted as it would amplify the potential of 
multicollinearity and linear dependence when instruments also act as regressors in the second stage.  
4
 Using a least squares regression to predict ownership levels in the first stage may produce estimate 
levels which happen to be negative. Although such values do not have a directly interpretable 
significance, their use still produces unbiased and consistent parameter estimates in the second stage of 
the 2 SLS regression. (Angrist and Krueger 2001)  
5
 The vector containing industry dummy variables is omitted in the equations which estimate the industry-
adjusted Tobin's Q.  
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Quebec, as well as dummy variables for industry.  Parameter k is a constant and μi is an 
error term.  
The second stage of the 2 SLS procedure estimates the endogenous relation between 
ownership and firm performance, using the estimated levels of ownership and 
performance from the first stage:  
 i = α + β' Xi + γ' GICi + δ    i + εi  (5) 
 owni = a + B' Zi + c   i + ei   (6) 
where   i and    i are estimated by equation (4). All other variables are defined as in 
equations (2) and (3). Since instruments contained within vector I in equation (4) are 
presumed to be exogenous to the system of equations, the subsequent estimates of 
ownership and performance used in equations (5) and (6) will similarly be determined 
from outside the system. The resulting parameter estimates will therefore be unbiased and 
consistent.  
4 Data 
4.1 Data Description 
This study measures the cross-sectional relationship between firm performance and 
ownership structure for the year 2011, using a final sample of 567 Canadian companies 
listed on the TSX. The original data sample consisted of 691 TSX listed stocks which 
were simultaneously present in the StockGuide, Osiris and Compustat databases. 
Ownership data was gathered from the Bureau van Dijk's Osiris database. Ownership 
percentage, investor type, and identities for the top equity holders by size, up to 10, were 
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collected for each firm over the 2007-2011 period, the time interval over which the 
database measured Canadian corporate ownership. For each firm, both the number of 
individual owners and the total percentage were calculated for the following categories: 
bank, financial company, industrial company, insurance company, mutual or pension 
fund, family, and private equity. Financial statement and market valuation data were 
collected from Standard & Poor's Compustat database. Data on multiple share class 
equity were individually collected from the TMX Group website. A measure of control 
augmentation, Blockholder Wedge, was calculated  as the difference in cash flow rights 
and control rights for owners exceeding 10% control of a given company obtained from 
StockGuide. In order to remain consistent with prior studies, such as King and Santor 
(2008), the number of firms in the sample was reduced to 567 after 124 observations 
were removed for failing to meet any of the following criteria: positive sales, non-missing 
book value of equity, positive assets, and non-missing values for income before 
depreciation, Tobin's Q less than or equal to 10.  All variables have 567 observations with 
the exception of the Multiple Class Dummy, and 5 Year % Sales Growth, that are 
collected for 549 and 393 firms respectively.  
4.2 Performance Measures 
Table 1 describes the variables used in the present study. Firm performance is  measured 
by Tobin's Q and Return on Assets (ROA). Tobin's Q, defined as the sum of short term 
debt, long term debt and market value of equity, divided the book value of assets proxies 
the firm's market performance. ROA, defined as the operating income before depreciation 
scaled by assets, proxies the firm's accounting performance. Since Q derives from the 
firm's market valuation, it is considered to be a forward looking measure of performance, 
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in contrast to ROA which evaluates past performance documented in accounting data. 
This study also includes an industry adjusted measure of Q, defined as the firm's Q 
divided by the firm's Global Industry Classification  (GIC) industry average Q. GIC 
industry classifications are used due to their greater ability to explain cross-sectional 
stock valuation multiples, compared to alternative industry measures (Bhojraj et al., 
2003). 
4.3 Control Variables 
The control variables are presented in Table 1. Ln(Assets) is the natural logarithm of 
assets for each firm. Leverage measures each firm's debt to assets ratio, where debt is the 
sum of both short term and long term debt. Capital expenditures is the firm's capital 
expenditures divided by the book value of total assets. The 5 year sales growth was 
calculated as the percent difference in sales from 2006 to 2011. Dividend, Crosslist, and 
multiple class dummy variables respectively take on a value of 1 when a firm either 
issues dividends, is cross-listed, or has multiple shares, and 0 otherwise. GIC dummy 
variables take on a value of 1 when a firm belongs to a particular industry (measured to 
the 4-digit level of the classification system), and 0 otherwise.
6
 All control variables 
represent values in the year 2011, with the exception of  the multiple dummy class, which 
was collected in 2013 reflecting contemporary data. 
4.4 Ownership Measures 
Institutional ownership is defined as either the total holdings or the total number of 
investors among  banks, financial companies, mutual and pension funds, and insurance 
                                                          
6
 An arbitrary industry dummy variable must be omitted from the regression equations to avoid linear 
dependence among regressors.  
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companies. These subcategories of institutional ownership are also measured separately. 
Family ownership measures holdings from individuals and families. This variable is 
distinct from industrial companies as a category, which may have a family as an ultimate 
owner. This implies that industrial companies may be an indirect manifestation of family 
ownership within the context of a pyramid structure.
7
  
As an example, Figure 1 displays an ownership chain from the Wallace McCain Family 
Group to the Canada Bread Company Limited. (Source: Statistics Canada Intercorporate 
Ownership Database) Canada Bread Company Limited is 89.8% owned by Canadian 
Bakeries Inc, an industrial company, which is in turn partially owned by a chain of four 
additional entities which ends with the Wallace McCain Family Group. The ultimate 
owner's cash flow rights are the product of the ownership percentages at each level of the 
pyramid, while the level control is considered to be the weakest link along the chain of 
ownership (Faccio and Lang, 2002). In the case of the Wallace McCain Family Group, 
they retain 25.94% control of the Canada Bread Company Limited with 3.73% of the 
cash flow rights.  
4.5 Descriptive Statistic  
Table 2 reports the summary statistics and difference of mean tests for the central 
variables in the analysis. Average Tobin's Q and industry-adjusted Tobin's Q are 1.40 and 
0.90 respectively; average return on assets is 5.8%. The largest average level of 
ownership is held by institutions totalling 20.82%, defined as the sum of bank, financial 
company, mutual and pension funds, and insurance company ownership which average 
                                                          
7
 Industrial companies are distinct from widely held corporations; they therefore have an ultimate owner 
by definition. 
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5.61%, 6.87%, 8.31% and 2.92 % respectively. Average ownership by family and 
industrial firms equal 6.69% and 8.40% respectively. The mean level of assets is $2.47 
billion. The average ratios of debt to assets and capital expenditures to assets are 0.17 and 
0.10. Dividend, Crosslist and Multiple Class represent dummy variables; among the firms 
in the sample 41%, 70%, and 23% issue dividends, are crosslisted, and use multiple 
classes of shares. The average blockholder wedge is 2.37%. 
The difference of mean tests compare firms with high levels of family ownership 
compared to those with low levels, based on a 20% ownership criterion. The subsample 
of firms with family ownership greater than 20% totals 70,  approximately 12% of the 
total sample. In comparison with the subsample of 497 firms with family ownership less 
than 20%,  the group with family ownership greater than 20% has a (statistically 
significant 5% or stronger) lower mean size, sales growth, capital expenditures and level 
of cross listing. With marginal statistical significance, the high-family ownership group 
has lower leverage and a blockholder control wedge, despite a lower occurrence of listed 
dual class shares.
8
 The differences in ownership structure involve lower levels of 
institutions both in number and percentage among high-family ownership firms, 
significant at the 1% level, with the exceptions of insurance companies as a percentage 
and the number of private equity investors. Industrial companies are less prevalent within 
the high-family ownership group. This may in part be due to their use within family 
ownership pyramids; families appear to substitute from direct ownership in favor of 
indirect ownership through industrial corporations.  
                                                          
8
 Only listed dual-class shares are observed on the TMX website, www.tmx.com. Some family firms may 
refrain from listing certain classes of shares with augmented voting rights. 
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4.6 Correlation Matrix 
Table 3 presents a correlation matrix for the key variables in the study. Although many 
relationships are statistically significant, none of the variables to be used together in the 
regressions have correlations above 0.7, a standard benchmark for multicollinearity 
(Pukthauanthong et al., 2012). Although Q and ROA each measure firm performance, the 
aspects which they capture are distinct; their correlation is -0.258 statistically significant 
at the 1% level. This relationship is similar to that found by King and Santor (2008) who 
document a negative relationship between Q and ROA, a correlation of -0.278.  
4.7 Controlling Positions 
Table 4 presents, across several studies, the percentages of firms with ultimate owners at 
both the 10% and 20% thresholds. Although the present study considers family 
ownership to be distinct from industrial company ownership, on the aggregate, the two 
are added together in this table for a more direct comparison with others studies. This is 
intended to reflect that industrial firms have an ultimate owner, who must be an 
individual or a family. In the current sample, the percentage of firms controlled by the 
sum of families and industrial companies at the 10% (20%) average 33.73% (23.58%). 
These values are smaller than those from prior studies. This likely results from the 
manner in which family ownership and industrial company ownership are summed. Since 
the present data does not allow an inference with regard to the relationship between the 
family owner and the industrial company owner at the firm level, they are assumed to be 
independent. At the firm level, their shareholdings therefore are not summed for the 
purposes of calculating the ownership threshold. Instances where a particular family 
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meets an ownership threshold only through stock both directly and indirectly through an 
industrial company are not observed.  
Although institutional ownership is more pronounced than family ownership as an 
average percentage,  family ownership is distributed less evenly across firms. This is 
evidenced by family investors holding proportionately 63% (41%) more controlling 
positions in firms at the 10% (20%) level. While the average family ownership stake is 
6.61%,  16.18%  (9.81%) of firms are controlled at the 10% (20%) level, compared with 
35.11% (8.95%) for institutions, which as a group hold an average of 20.82% in a given 
company. This is consistent with families holding large stakes in specific firms for the 
purpose of control instead of holding a large diversified portfolio for the purpose of 
maximizing risk-adjusted returns.  
5 Empirical Results 
5.1 Full Sample OLS Analysis 
Table 5 presents results for the estimation of equation (1) using the entire sample. Panel 
A presents the results where Tobin's Q is the measure of performance. Robust to all but 
two specifications, Ln(Assets), Leverage, Blockholder Wedge, and Multiple Class 
Dummy are negatively associated with Tobin's Q, while Dividend Dummy and Crosslist 
have a positive relationship at the standard levels of statistical significance. Capital 
expenditures  and sales growth are not statistically significant. The signs on these control 
variables agree with similar empirical  studies (Villalonga and Amit, 2006, King and 
Santor, 2008). 
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The effects of dividends, crosslistings, multiple class shares and blockholder control 
wedges may have an effect on Tobin's Q due to their impact on agency costs within the 
firm. Dividends increase market value by reducing free cash flow available to managerial 
discretion thereby reducing the possibility of value destroying investments.
9
  (Jensen, 
1986) Crosslisting in the United States lowers agency costs by forcing higher information 
disclosure and increases scrutiny from the market as a whole. (Coffee, 2002, King and 
Segal, 2009) Multiple class shares and blockholder control wedges reduce Tobin's Q 
since agency problem II is exacerbated, as large owners may have the power to make 
decisions without bearing the entirety of their economic consequences (Bebchuck et al., 
2000, Villalonga and Amit, 2006). 
Institutional ownership measured as a percentage is not significant in explaining Tobin's 
Q. Private equity has a significant negative relationship with Tobin's Q which is not 
robust. This observation stands as a potential signal of endogeneity, since private equity 
firms are associated with take-over activity such as leveraged buyouts.  It is possible that 
the negative association between private equity and underperforming firms results from 
private equity selecting underperforming firms for investment. The absence of a 
association between any form of ownership by percentage with Tobin's Q is consistent 
with the endogeneity argument of Demsetz and Lehn (1985).  
The count measures of ownership show a statistically significant positive relationship 
between institutional ownership and Tobin's Q. When institutional ownership is broken 
down into subcategories, banks and financial companies maintain a statistically 
                                                          
9
 Aside from the reduction in free cash flow caused by dividends, Myers and Majluf (1984) argue market 
valuation levels are increased due to a signalling effect caused by such payments. 
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significant relationship at the 1% level. Insurance companies have a marginally 
significant positive estimate which is not robust. The relationship between the number of 
institutional owners and performance is similar to results from Cornett et al. (2003) who 
observe a positive relationship between the number of institutional owners and corporate 
operating performance. The positive association between financial companies and 
Tobin's Q is consistent with the findings of Brickley et al. (1988) who suggest that 
owners who are pressure-resistant to management may be effective monitors. The 
positive relationship associated with banks is inconsistent with the assumption that they 
are considered pressure-sensitive. This positive relation is consistent with the results of 
Gorton and Schmid (2000) who report a positive relationship between bank ownership 
levels and the market to book ratio of German firms.  
Panel B of Table 5 presents the estimation for equation (1) using the GIC Industry-
Adjusted Tobin's Q as a measure of firm performance. Instead of industry control 
dummies, Industry-Adjusted Q is defined as the ratio of the firm's Q over the industry 
average Q. Although the direction of parameter estimates in Panel B is unchanged from 
Panel A, statistical significance levels change slightly. The ownership percentage of 
insurance companies is associated with a lower industry-adjusted Q, and this is robust in 
two out of three specifications. This is consistent with the assumption that insurance 
companies as a pressure-sensitive investors (Brickley et al., 1988). Private equity 
maintains a negative relationship with performance, consistent with a potential 
endogenous selection of underperforming firms for investment. 
 An increase in the number of individual and family owners has a marginally significant 
positive effect on the industry adjusted Tobin's Q as was the case for the unadjusted Q. 
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This is consistent with studies that find family ownership increases performance by 
combating the owner-manager conflict (Villalonga and Amit, 2004, Pukthauanthong et 
al., 2012). A characteristic difference between the Q and Industry-Adjusted Q results is 
that the R-Square values are consistently lower in the Industry-Adjusted Q  regressions. 
The change in the R-Square may result from the fact that some information within of the 
industry classification dummies becomes part of the dependent variable in the Industry-
Adjusted Q regressions.  
Panel C presents the regression results of equation (1) with ROA as the measure 
performance. Ln(Assets), Dividend, Sales Growth and Capital Expenditures are positive, 
while Crosslist is negative. These variables are significant across all specifications. 
Leverage has marginal statistical significance only under models which contain sales 
growth. The measures of control augmentation provide mixed results:  the Multiple Class 
Dummy is negative, with inconsistent levels of significance and Blockholer Wedge has 
no observable relationship with ROA; the weak negative relationship between the 
Multiple Class Dummy and  ROA suggests the presence of agency problems among dual 
class firms. Although Crosslist is hypothesized to lower agency costs via self "bonding" 
to higher disclosure standards (Coffee, 2002), it has a significant negative relationship 
with ROA. On the whole, results for the control variables are consistent with those of 
King and Santor (2008) with the exception of Leverage, which they find to be negatively 
related to ROA.  
The positive relationships both leverage and dividend share with ROA is consistent with 
the use of these variables as agency cost control mechanisms because they reduce free 
cash flow to management (Jensen, 1986). According to this explanation, firms with 
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dividend or debt obligations pay out free cash flow that would otherwise go towards 
investments in assets. Since there are diminishing marginal returns to investments, firms 
which are constrained in their spending will be forced to select more profitable projects 
with higher returns on assets.  
The institutional ownership variable has a marginally significant positive relation with 
ROA, but only in the model specification which omits sales growth. The same 
relationship exists for private equity firms, financial companies as well as for mutual and 
pension funds. The results suggest that banks and insurance company ownership percent 
ownership levels have no statistical association with ROA, consistent with their position 
as pressure sensitive investors (Brickley et al., 1988).  
This finding is reinforced with a strong negative relationship between the number of bank 
owners and ROA, despite insignificant values for the number of institutions as a whole. 
The inferior performance associated with pressure sensitive banks is consistent with the 
results of Cornet et al. (2003), who find the number of pressure sensitive institutional 
investors has no relationship with operating cash flow returns, while the number of 
pressure resistant institutional investors has a positive relationship.  
  
32 
 
5.2 Subsample OLS Analysis: Firms with  Family  Ownership Greater than 20% 
The hypothesis that there exists a relationship between firm performance and ownership 
structure is tested among firms  with family ownership greater than 20%, since these 
firms are more likely to face Agency Cost II. OLS regression equation (1) estimates are 
presented in Table 6. Panels A and B present regression results for measures of 
performance Q and Industry-Adjusted Q. Coefficients cannot be given a statistical 
interpretation because across all specifications, F-statistics do not reject the null 
hypothesis that all parameters are equal to zero. 
Panel C presents regression results where performance is measured by ROA. Under these 
specifications, all 10 equations have p-values associated with the F-test of joint 
significance below 1%. Adjusted R-square values are above 35%. Statistically significant 
control variables are consistent with their counterparts in the entire-sample regressions, 
suggesting that their role within the dynamics of family firms mirrors that of the market 
as a whole. Although not robust across specifications, percent ownership levels of mutual 
and pension funds as well as private equity firms are associated with higher levels of 
ROA, as is the case with the entire-sample results.  
5.3 Subsample OLS Analysis: Firms with  Institutional  Ownership Greater than 20% 
Table 7 presents regression results for model (1) applied to the subsample of firms with 
total institutional ownership greater than 20%. The subsample consists of 306 firms, 
overlapping with over half of the entire sample. Q, Industry-Adjusted Q and ROA results 
are presented in panels  A, B and C respectively. Parameter estimates maintain the same 
direction within the subsample, although their associated levels of significance vary. The 
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percentage ownership of insurance companies is significantly negative for both measures 
of Tobin's Q. In addition, unlike the entire sample, a similar  negative relation for the 
percent ownership of mutual or pension funds is significant across several specifications. 
This may be indicative of agency problems which arise due to excessive institutional 
investment.   
 A non-robust positive association for family ownership with ROA exists within the 
subsample, significant at the 5% level. This finding may be attributable to families 
playing a larger marginal role among within firms dominated by other types of 
shareholders. However the evidence overall suggests that all agency control mechanisms 
may have similar associations with performance across subsamples.  
5.4 Full Sample 2 SLS Analysis 
Table 8 presents regression results for equation (5), where levels of institutional 
ownership are simultaneously estimated by equation (4). Industrial and family ownership 
levels, as well as all control variables maintain the same directions and similar levels of 
significance, since they are estimated in the same manner as in the OLS procedure.  
Regressions in which Tobin's Q is the measure of firm performance yield no statistically 
significant results among the endogenous ownership variables. This is also the case in 
panels E and F for ROA. When the industry-adjusted Q is used, insurance companies are 
associated with lower levels of performance. This is illustrated once in Panel C, model 
14, where the percent ownership of insurance companies is negative at the 5% level, and 
3 out of 3 times in Panel D for the ownership count. There are no other statistically 
significant results for the endogenously determined parameters estimates of equation (5). 
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The negative association between insurance company ownership and firm performance 
observed both in the OLS and 2 SLS regressions with the industry-adjusted Tobin's Q, is 
the only relationship robust across both estimation procedures. The reduction in value 
due to insurance companies as investors is consistent with their position as pressure 
sensitive investors (Brickley et al., 1988). The failure of any ownership type to add value 
to the performance of firms within the 2 SLS framework is consistent with the 
endogeneity argument of Demsetz and Lehn (1985).  
The regression results for equation (6) are presented in Table 9 where ownership is 
explained in part by performance, which is is estimated in the first stage by equation (4). 
Panels A and B report results for which Q is the measure of performance. The results in 
Panel A suggest that Q is generally associated with higher percentage levels of 
institutional ownership although not in the case mutual and pension funds or insurance 
companies. In the regressions which model the number of owners, Q is associated with a 
greater number of bank and financial investors although the relation is less robust in the 
case of bank ownership. Tobin's Q has a significantly negative relation with the number 
of mutual and pension fund investors. These disparities may be attributable to differences 
in investment strategy. Negative or non-significant values associated with passive mutual 
and pension funds or insurance companies may result from such investors rebalancing 
their portfolios on a regular basis. Companies which increase (decrease) in market value 
and Tobin's Q could be sold (bought) to maintain particular portfolio characteristics such 
as beta or a predetermined asset allocation.  
The only significant relation between industry-adjusted Q and ownership is negative with 
the number of insurance companies, presented in Panel D and robust to both 
35 
 
specifications at the 5% and 10% level. ROA has a positive significant relation with both 
measures of insurance companies, presented in Panels E and F. ROA has a significantly 
negative relation with the number of bank owners in Panel F. No other significant 
relationships were found to exist between performance and ownership within the 2 SLS 
framework.  
Based on the 2 SLS analysis, the relation between insurance company investment and 
firm performance appears to be endogenous, particularly in the case of market 
performance proxied by the industry-adjusted Tobin's Q. Increases in count or percentage 
levels of insurance company ownership is associated with lower levels of industry-
adjusted Tobin's Q (Table 8, Panel C and D), while increases in the industry-adjusted 
Tobin's Q is associated with a lower number of insurance company investors (Table 9, 
Panel D). Although endogeneity is apparent in this case, the Hausman (1978) tests which 
appear in the following section, discuss the possible implications on the interpretation of 
the OLS results.  
  
36 
 
5.5 Hausman (1978)Tests For Endogeneity  
The null hypothesis that parameter estimates associated with measures of institutional 
ownership are consistent between the OLS and 2 SLS methodologies is rejected using the 
Hausman tests. This finding, which is not robust to all specifications, compliments many 
of the results of equation (6) in Section 5.4. These results tend to confirm the existence of 
an endogenous relationship between institutional ownership and firm performance. 
Analysis of the OLS results does not permit the attribution of performance levels to a 
measure of ownership, as OLS parameter estimates may be spurious (Duggal and Millar, 
1999).  Meaningful interpretation of the results must rely exclusively on the 2 SLS 
regressions. 
6 Conclusion 
This study presents an analysis of the relationship between institutional ownership and 
firm performance measured by Tobin's Q and return on assets (ROA) using a sample of 
567 Canadian firms  in 2011. The focus on the Canadian firms provides additional insight 
towards the topic of institutional ownership as a remedial measure towards agency 
problems, since Canada has shared legal traditions with the United States, but has 
ownership concentration more comparable to levels in Western Europe and Asia (La 
Porta et al., 1997, La Porta et al., 1999). Moreover, compared to their American 
counterparts, controlling shareholders of Canadian firms make greater use of control 
augmentation mechanisms such as dual class shares and pyramid structures (Attig and 
Gadhoum, 2003, Gadhoum et al., 2006).  
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A distinguishing feature of this study's analysis involves the consideration of institutional 
investor type as well as the inclusion of the number of such investors as a measure of 
ownership. This distinction among investors by type attempts to account for differences 
in their respective motivations. Pressure-sensitive institutional investors may choose to 
categorically support the firm's management in an effort to promote other business 
relationships (Brickley et al., 1988). Such investors would be ineffective as monitors. The 
number of owners is considered as prior studies have found investor coalitions to 
influence firm performance (Gorton and Schmid, 2000, Cornett et al., 2003).  
The effects of institutional ownership on  performance measures Tobin's Q, Industry-
Adjusted Tobin's Q, and  Return on Assets are estimated using ordinary least squares 
(OLS) and two-stage least squares (2SLS) methodology, where the latter is employed to 
offset the endogeneity bias to which the OLS method is susceptible. The OLS regression 
results suggest statistically significant relations between institutional ownership and firm 
performance, using both Tobin's Q and ROA. Specifically, the number of institutional 
investors, particularly in the subcategories of bank and financial company, are associated 
with higher levels of Tobin's Q, unadjusted and adjusted for industry. A greater number 
of bank investors are observed with lower levels of ROA. Once the 2 SLS methodology 
was employed, these relations were not observed with statistical significance. However, 
the 2 SLS results suggested a statistically negative relation between firm performance 
measured by the industry-adjusted Tobin's Q and insurance company ownership 
measured both as a percentage and as the number of owners. For all measures of 
performance, Hausman tests reveal that OLS results are biased in multiple instances; 
meaningful interpretation must therefore rely on the 2 SLS results.  
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The findings of this study are largely consistent with the endogeneity argument of 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985): the market equilibrates the marginal costs and benefits of all 
performance enhancing mechanisms such that in a cross sectional regression, no 
relationships between such mechanisms and performance may be observed.  The 
exception is both types ownership levels by insurance companies, which are negatively 
related to Tobin's Q and the Industry-Adjusted Tobin's Q in both the OLS and 2 SLS 
methodologies. The inferior performance associated with insurance company ownership 
may be related to their place as pressure-sensitive investors who are not willing to 
challenge management for fear of hurting other business relations (Brickley et al., 1988). 
The results suggests that there is a failure in the market for corporate control to 
equilibrate the marginal costs with the marginal benefits brought upon by insurance 
company ownership. This may be due to lacking mechanisms (Agrawal and Knoeber, 
1996) which would have to specifically compensate insurance companies for divesting 
their positions. 
While this study suggests that ownership structure affects firm performance, future 
research may bring about greater insight into the relationship's causal dynamics. A 
natural extension would involve the examination of cross-sectional data over several 
years which would allow the possibility of establishing causality through lagged 
variables. In addition, an investigation into the actual business relations between apparent 
pressure-sensitive investors and the corporations in which they own equity would clarify 
how such owners are compromised as monitors. Specifically such research could involve 
a consideration for bank loans and insurance policies held by firms.  
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8 Tables and Figures 
 
 
Figure 1: Canada Bread Ownership Chain to Wallace McCain Family Group
% Ownership 
Along Chain
% Cashflows 
Rights to Wallace 
McCain Family 
Group
Control Rights to 
Wallace McCain 
Family Group%
1: WALLACE MCCAIN FAMILY GROUP
53.03% 53.03% 53.03%
2: JSM CAPITAL CORPORATION
24.94% 13.23% 24.94%
3: MCCAIN CAPITAL CORPORATION
31.37%
6: CANADA BREAD COMPANY, LIMITED
Figure 1: Ownership and control rights to Wallace McCain Family Group, the ultimate owner of the Canada Bread Company Limited. Ownership along the chain is the direct ownership from the owner immediately 
above in the hierarchy, where the Wallace McCainn Family Group is the highest. Cash flow rights to the Wallace McCain group are the product of the cash flow rights along the ownership chain. Control Rights to the 
Wallace McCain Family group are defined as the weakest link of ownership rights along the chain, according to Faccio and Lang (2002). Source: Statistics Canada Intercorporate Ownership Database 1st Quarter 2012
4.15% 24.94%
4: MAPLE LEAF FOODS INC
100.00% 4.15% 24.94%
5: CANADIAN BAKERIES INC 
89.80% 3.73% 24.94%
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Table 1: List of Variable Descriptions and Data Sources
Variable Description Data  Source
Ln(Assets) Natural Logarithm of Total Assets Compustat
Dividend Dummy Equals 1 if firm issues dividends; 0 otherwise. Compustat
Leverage (Short Term Debt + Long Term Debt) / Total Assets Compustat
Mclass Equals 1 if firm has multiple classes of shares traded on the TSX; 0 otherwise. TMX Website
Blockholder Wedge Ʃ (Voting Control % - Cash flow rights %) for blockholders greater than 10% StockGuide
5 Year % Sales Growth Percent Change in Sales from 2006-2011 Compustat
Crosslist Equals 1 if firm is additionally listed in the United States; 0 otherwise. Compustat
Capital Expenditures Capital Expenditures / Total Assets Compustat
ROA Return on Assets: Operating Income Before Depreciation / Total Assets Compustat
Q Tobin's Q: (Market Value of Equity + Book Value of Short Term Debt + Book Value of Long Term Debt) / Book Value of Assets Compustat
GIC Industry-Adjusted Q GIC Industry Adjusted Q: (Tobin's Q) / (GIC Industry Average Tobin's Q) Compustat
Institution Sum of Bank, Financial, Mutual / Pension Fund, and Insurance Osiris Database: Bureau Van Dijk
Bank Sum of Ownership Percentage Values for all Banks among the top 10 Shareholders by Percentage Osiris Database: Bureau Van Dijk
Financial Sum of Ownership Percentage Values for all Financial Companies among the top 10 Shareholders by Percentage Osiris Database: Bureau Van Dijk
Mutual / Pension Fund Sum of Ownership Percentage Values for all Mutual or Pension Funds among the top 10 Shareholders by Percentage Osiris Database: Bureau Van Dijk
Insurance Sum of Ownership Percentage Values for all Insurance Companies among the top 10 Shareholders by Percentage Osiris Database: Bureau Van Dijk
Private equity Sum of Ownership Percentage Values for all Private Equity Firms among the top 10 Shareholders by Percentage Osiris Database: Bureau Van Dijk
Family Sum of Ownership Percentage Values for all Individuals or Families among the top 10 Shareholders by Percentage Osiris Database: Bureau Van Dijk
Industrial Sum of Ownership Percentage Values for all Industrial Companies among the top 10 Shareholders by Percentage Osiris Database: Bureau Van Dijk
Institution Sum of Bank, Financial, Mutual / Pension Fund, and Insurance Osiris Database: Bureau Van Dijk
Bank The Number of Distinct Bank Owners among the top 10 Shareholders Osiris Database: Bureau Van Dijk
Financial The Number of Distinct Financial Company Owners among the top 10 Shareholders Osiris Database: Bureau Van Dijk
Mutual / Pension Fund The Number of Distinct Mutual and Pension Fund Owners among the top 10 Shareholders Osiris Database: Bureau Van Dijk
Insurance The Number of Distinct Insurance Company Owners among the top 10 Shareholders Osiris Database: Bureau Van Dijk
Private Equity The Number of Distinct Private Equity Firm Owners among the top 10 Shareholders Osiris Database: Bureau Van Dijk
Family The Number of Distinct Individual and Family Owners among the top 10 Shareholders Osiris Database: Bureau Van Dijk
Industrial The Number of Distinct Industrial Company Owners among the top 10 Shareholders Osiris Database: Bureau Van Dijk
Control Variables
Performance Measures
Ownership Percentage Values
Ownership Count Values
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N Mean Std Dev Sum Minimum Maximum
Family<20% 
N=497
Family>20% 
N=70
t-statistic
Q 567 1.396 1.084 791.532 0.168 8.36 1.432 1.139 2.139**
GIC_ADJ_Q 567 0.889 0.571 504.063 0.571 4.355 0.896 0.835 0.841
ROA 567 0.058 0.165 32.7487 -0.94004 0.55365 0.05 0.09 -2.109**
Institution 567 20.819 16.001 11825 0 97.57 29.81 18.32 4.982***
Bank 567 5.605 6.468 3184 0 45.85 6.13 3.44 3.706***
Financial 567 6.865 8.403 3899 0 75.54 7.54 3.59 5.536***
Mutual / Pension Fund 567 8.313 11.354 4722 0 94.76 10.05 6.15 3.010***
Insurance 567 2.922 5.522 1659 0 73.5 2.84 3.32 -0.55
Private equity 567 3.115 10.778 1772 0 89.96 3.25 1.82 2.040**
Family 567 6.689 16.294 3806 0 94.15 1.39 43.16 -17.205***
Industrial 567 8.395 18.268 4768 0 95.36 9.09 3.18 4.834***
Institution 567 5.320 2.384 3027 0 10 29.81 18.32 4.982***
Bank 567 1.745 1.393 993 0 6 1.83 1.17 4.525***
Financial 567 1.559 1.158 887 0 5 1.62 1.09 4.007***
Mutual / Pension Fund 567 2.016 1.438 1147 0 7 2.11 1.41 4.181***
Insurance 567 0.791 0.805 450 0 4 0.81 0.57 2.691***
Private Equity 567 0.620 0.765 353 0 4 0.62 0.61 0.01
Family 567 0.420 0.816 239 0 6 0.22 1.79 -13.460***
Industrial 567 0.747 0.909 425 0 5 0.78 0.49 2.916***
Assets 567 2469.938 7696.364 1432564.27 6.193 91030 2681.76 926.69 3.675***
Dividend Dummy 567 0.413 0.493 235 0 1 0.41 0.46 -0.70
Leverage 567 0.170 0.173 96.52147 0 0.66538 0.17 0.20 -1.376*
mclass 549 0.228 0.420 125 0 1 0.24 0.17 1.311*
Blockholder Wedge 567 2.365 10.408 1346 0 89.04 2.37 4.43 -1.439*
5 Year % Sales Growth 393 3.963 16.523 1557 -0.92718 186.08046 4.19 2.14 1.961**
Crosslist 567 0.703 0.457 400 0 1 0.72 0.54 2.866***
Capital Expenditures 567 0.101 0.106 57.974 -0.0026 0.88 0.10 0.08 1.667*
Ownership Count Values
Table 2 -Descriptive Statistics
Entire Sample Values Subsample Difference of Mean Test
Control Variables
Performance Measures
Ownership Percentage Values
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Table 2- Descriptive Statistics. Sample includes 567 Canadian firms from 2011. Tobin's Q is (Market Value of Equity + Book Value of Short Term Debt + Book Value of Long Term Debt)/Book Value of Assets. 
GIC Industry-Adjusted Q is Tobin's Q divided by the GIC industry average Tobin's Q, where the GIC average is determined using a sample of 1161 Canadian Firms from Compustat. ROA is Operating Income 
Before Depriciation / Total Assets. Ln(Assets) is the natural logarithm of total assets. Dividend Dummy takes on a value of 1 when dividends are issued and 0 otherwise. Leverage is (Short Term Debt + Long 
Term Debt) / Assets. Multiple Class Dummy takes on a value of 1 if multiple classes of shares are traded. Blockholder Wedge is the difference in control rights and cash flow rights for blockholders greater 
than 10%. Crosslist Dummy takes on a value of 1 if shares are listed in the United States and 0 otherwise. Capital Expenditures is scaled by assets. Ownership Percentage values equal the total ownership 
percentage for a category of owner. Ownership count values equal the number of owners for a category of ownership. Institution is the sum of Bank, Financial, Mutual/Pension Fund, and Insurance. 
Subsample difference of mean test t-statistic values significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels are denoted by *, **, and *** respectively. 
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Table 3 - Correlation Matrix
Ln(A
ssets)
D
ividend D
um
m
y
Leverage
m
class
vospread
5 Year %
 Sales G
row
th
Crosslist
Capital Expenditures
R
O
A
Q
G
IC
_A
D
J_Q
Ln(Assets) 1
Dividend Dummy 0.52*** 1
Leverage 0.38*** 0.33*** 1
mclass 0.33*** 0.26*** 0.33*** 1
vospread 0.15*** 0.19*** 0.03 0.12*** 1
5 Year % Sales Growth 0.04 -0.08 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 1
Crosslist 0.23*** -0.15*** -0.12*** 0.10** -0.02 0.05 1
Capital Expenditures -0.028 -0.256***-0.115*** -0.039 -0.108 0.003 0.183*** 1
ROA 0.39*** 0.43*** 0.22*** 0.06 0.11*** 0.08 -0.15*** 0.005 1
Q -0.203***-0.114***-0.242***-0.149*** -0.091** 0.08 0.182*** 0.085** -0.258* 1
GIC_ADJ_Q -0.06 0.05 -0.1122*** -0.073* -0.05 0.03 0.115*** 0.086** -0.07 0.873*** 1
Institution 0.13*** 0.09** 0.01 0.02 0.16*** -0.01 0.04 0.024 0.14*** -0.01 -0.02
Bank 0.26*** 0.13*** 0.04 0.09** -0.01 -0.03 0.10** 0.049 0.09** 0.03 0.05
Financial 0.13*** 0.10** 0.05 -0.01 0.04 0.05 0.03 -0.042 0.14*** 0.02 0.02
Mutual / Pension Fund -0.03 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 0.19*** -0.02 -0.02 0.028 0.06 -0.01 -0.03
Insurance 0.17*** 0.07* -0.02 0.08* 0.11*** -0.06 0.00 0.028 0.11** -0.076* -0.071*
Private equity 0.02 -0.07 0.01 -0.01 0.09** 0.00 0.08* -0.029 0.02 -0.04 -0.077*
Family -0.09** 0.04 0.01 -0.04 0.15*** -0.04 -0.12*** -0.083** 0.05 -0.05 0.00
Industrial -0.03 0.06 -0.05 0.00 0.19*** -0.01 -0.15*** -0.062 -0.02 -0.05 -0.05
Institution 0.39*** 0.09** 0.01 0.12*** -0.03 0.02 0.31*** 0.130*** 0.05 0.139*** 0.168***
Bank 0.46*** 0.20*** 0.07 0.16*** -0.03 -0.06 0.25*** 0.108** 0.02 0.117*** 0.161***
Financial 0.23*** 0.08* 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.16*** 0.047 0.08* 0.161*** 0.171***
Mutual / Pension Fund 0.01 -0.10** -0.06 0.01 -0.04 0.05 0.14*** 0.074* 0.00 0.01 0.00
Insurance 0.34*** 0.26*** -0.01 0.12*** 0.19*** -0.06 0.07* 0.038 0.20*** 0.01 0.03
Private Equity 0.02 -0.02 0.09** 0.02 0.00 -0.05 0.02 0.060 0.02 -0.01 -0.04
Family -0.19*** -0.05 -0.03 -0.08* 0.04 -0.02 -0.10** 0.003 0.00 0.01 0.00
Industrial -0.12*** -0.13*** -0.19*** -0.03 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.079* -0.16*** 0.083*** 0.05
Control Variables Performance Measures
Control Variables
Performance Measures
Ownership Percentage Values
Ownership Count Values
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Institution
B
ank
Financial
M
utual / Pension Fund
Insurance
PrivateEquity
Fam
ily
Industrial
Institution
B
ank
Financial
M
utual / Pension Fund
Insurance
PrivateEquity
Fam
ily
Industrial
Institution 1
Bank 0.41*** 1
Financial 0.50*** 0.09** 1
Mutual / Pension Fund 0.80*** 0.00 0.04 1
Insurance -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.02 1
Private equity -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.01 0.06 1
Family -0.16*** -0.12*** -0.14*** -0.08* 0.03 -0.05 1
Industrial -0.11*** -0.12*** -0.08** -0.04 -0.03 0.03 -0.10 1
Institution 0.39*** 0.37*** 0.27*** 0.16*** -0.01 -0.02 -0.25*** -0.20*** 1
Bank 0.22*** 0.57*** 0.06 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.15*** -0.15*** 0.65*** 1
Financial 0.20*** 0.11** 0.52*** -0.08* -0.01 0.00 -0.16*** -0.14*** 0.59*** 0.20*** 1
Mutual / Pension Fund 0.27*** -0.01 -0.03 0.36*** 0.00 0.00 -0.15*** -0.07* 0.56*** -0.05 -0.03 1
Insurance 0.00 0.09** 0.01 -0.05 0.48*** 0.01 -0.08** -0.04 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.12*** 0.02 1
Private Equity -0.07* -0.07 0.00 -0.07 0.08* 0.35*** -0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.11*** 1
Family -0.13*** -0.14*** -0.12*** -0.04 -0.03 -0.06 0.70*** -0.07* -0.33*** -0.23*** -0.21*** -0.14*** -0.16*** -0.09** 1
Industrial -0.14*** -0.09** -0.13*** -0.05 -0.09** -0.06 -0.09** 0.51*** -0.13*** -0.12*** -0.10** -0.03 -0.13*** -0.12*** -0.08*** 1
Ownership Percentage Values
Ownership Count Values
Ownership Percentage Values Ownership Count Values
Table 3- Correlation Matrix. Sample includes 567 Canadian firms from 2011. Variable descriptions are available in Table 1. Tobin's Q is (Market Value of Equity + Book Value of Short Term Debt 
+ Book Value of Long Term Debt)/Book Value of Assets. GIC Industry-Adjusted Q is Tobin's Q divided by the GIC industry average Tobin's Q, where the GIC average is determined using a 
sample of 1161 Canadian Firms from Compustat. ROA is Operating Income Before Depriciation / Total Assets. Ln(Assets) is the natural logarithm of total assets. Dividend Dummy takes on a 
value of 1 when dividends are issued and 0 otherwise. Leverage is (Short Term Debt + Long Term Debt) / Assets. Multiple Class Dummy takes on a value of 1 if multiple classes of shares are 
traded. Blockholder Wedge is the difference in control rights and cash flow rights for blockholders greater than 10%. Crosslist Dummy takes on a value of 1 if shares are listed in the United 
States and 0 otherwise. Capital Expenditures is scaled by assets. Ownership Percentage values equal the total ownership percentage for a category of owner. Ownership count values equal 
the number of owners for a category of ownership. Institution is the sum of Bank, Financial, Mutual/Pension Fund, and Insurance. Correlation values significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels 
are denoted by *, **, and *** respectively. 
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Table 4- Frequency Distribution of Ultimate Owners Across Studies
Year
Country
Ownership Threshold 10% 20% 10% 20% 10% 20% 20%
Widely Held 25.13% 63.86% 40.00% 60.00% 18.22% 37.21% 55.40%
Ultimate Owner 74.87% 36.14% 60.00% 40.00% 81.78% 62.79% 44.60%
Family Group 33.73% 23.58% 50.00% 30.00% 56.60% 41.07% 31.20%
Family 16.18% 9.81%
Industrial company 17.56% 13.77%
Corporation 0.52% 0.52% 0.00% 0.00% 10.79% 9.66% 2.60%
Institution 35.11% 8.95% 0.00% 0.00% 17.94% 11.15% 10.80%
Bank 5.51% 0.86%
Financial company 14.80% 3.79%
Insurance company 1.72% 0.17%
Mutual / Pension Fund 13.08% 4.13%
State 0.17% 0.00% 10.00% 10.00% 4.46% 2.03% 0.00%
Miscellaneous 5.33% 3.10% 0.00% 0.00% 10.88% 4.96% 0.00%
Market Capitalization
This Study La Porta et al. 1999 Attig  and Gadhoum 2003 King and Santor 2008
2011 1995 1996 1998
Percentages of firms with ultimate owners at  the 10% and 20% level. Family Group is the sum of Family and Industrial Company for a more direct comparison with other 
studies which trace ultimate ownership beyond the level of industrial companies. Institution is the sum of bank, financial company, insurance company, as well as mutual / 
pension fund. Firms which do not have an ultimate owner are considered to be widely held. 
Canada Canada Canada Canada
> 10 Million >500 Million >10 Million
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Table 5 - Full Sampe OLS Regression Results
Panel A
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Dependent Variable: Q
Parameter Estimates
Intercept 1.353*** 1.672*** 1.713*** 1.748*** 1.413*** 1.111*** 1.501*** 1.682*** 1.449*** 1.109***
Ownership Percentage Values
Institution 0.000 -0.001
Bank 0.007 0.006 0.007
Financial 0.002 0.000 0.006
Mutual / Pension Fund -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
Insurance -0.007* -0.007 -0.010
Private Equity -0.005** -0.007
Family -0.001 -0.002
Industrial Company -0.004 0.000
Ownership Count Values
Institution 0.089*** 0.086***
Bank 0.136*** 0.153*** 0.120***
Financial 0.143*** 0.162*** 0.185***
Mutual / Pension Fund 0.011 0.023 0.031
Insurance 0.065 0.090** 0.052
Private Equity -0.010 0.057
Family 0.109* 0.009
Industrial Company 0.083* 0.094*
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Control Variables
Ln (Assets) -0.081** -0.124*** -0.129*** -0.128*** -0.088** -0.143*** -0.189*** -0.210*** -0.209*** -0.165***
Dividend Dummy 0.330*** 0.360*** 0.338*** 0.342*** 0.313*** 0.315** 0.352*** 0.319*** 0.315*** 0.301**
Leverage -0.814*** -0.744*** -0.761*** -0.764*** -0.822*** -0.561** -0.540** -0.530** -0.428* -0.538*
Multiple Class Dummy -0.247*** -0.262*** -0.297*** -0.291***
Blockholder Wedge -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.005** -0.003 -0.006** -0.007*** -0.005** -0.005** -0.006** -0.007***
5 Year % Sales Growth 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
Crosslist Dummy 0.296*** 0.410*** 0.407*** 0.387*** 0.328*** 0.228*** 0.342*** 0.341*** 0.337*** 0.258**
Capital Expenditures 0.478 0.708 0.720 0.670 0.283 0.456 0.408 0.325
GIC Dummy Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 381 567 567 567 382 381 567 567 567 382
R-Square 0.237 0.199 0.204 0.209 0.245 0.272 0.229 0.247 0.255 0.299
Adj R-Sq 0.176 0.161 0.161 0.162 0.174 0.214 0.192 0.206 0.210 0.232
Pr > F <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
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Panel B
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Dependent Variable:                                        
GIC Industry-Adjusted Q
Parameter Estimates
Intercept 0.928*** 0.975*** 1.015*** 1.000*** 0.958*** 0.833*** 0.904*** 0.969*** 0.868*** 0.817***
Ownership Percentage Values
Institution -0.001 -0.001
Bank 0.004 0.004 0.003
Financial 0.001 0.001 0.003
Mutual / Pension Fund -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
Insurance -0.007*** -0.006** -0.010
Private Equity -0.003** -0.005*
Family 0.000 0.000
Industrial Company -0.001 0.000
Ownership Count Values
Institution 0.045*** 0.044***
Bank 0.074*** 0.082*** 0.080***
Financial 0.080*** 0.089*** 0.102***
Mutual / Pension Fund 0.005 0.011 0.013
Insurance 0.012 0.030 0.004
Private Equity -0.016 0.011
Family 0.050 0.012
Industrial Company 0.051* 0.069**
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Control Variables
Ln (Assets) -0.025 -0.051*** -0.031* -0.052*** -0.023 -0.056** -0.083*** -0.093*** -0.094*** -0.069**
Dividend Dummy 0.243*** 0.263*** 0.204*** 0.247*** 0.210*** 0.224*** 0.259*** 0.253*** 0.249*** 0.216***
Leverage -0.415** -0.326** -0.422*** -0.329** -0.419** -0.281* -0.204 -0.198 -0.133 -0.219
Multiple Class Dummy -0.111** -0.116** -0.131** -0.136*
Blockholder Wedge -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.002 -0.002 -0.005** -0.005*** -0.003* -0.002 -0.003* -0.005***
5 Year % Sales Growth 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001
Crosslist Dummy 0.144** 0.193*** 0.188*** 0.175** 0.111 0.152*** 0.145*** 0.142*** 0.120*
Capital Expenditures 0.429 0.513** 0.595** 0.497** 0.357 0.406* 0.396 0.341
GIC Dummy Controls NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Observations 381 567 567 567 382 381 567 567 567 382
R-Square 0.065 0.061 0.050 0.072 0.073 0.095 0.090 0.113 0.122 0.133
Adj R-Sq 0.043 0.049 0.034 0.050 0.037 0.073 0.079 0.097 0.102 0.100
Pr > F 0.003 <.0001 0.001 <.0001 0.014 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
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Panel C
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Dependent Variable: ROA
Parameter Estimates
Intercept -0.196*** -0.147*** -0.152*** -0.152*** -0.176*** -0.189*** -0.130*** -0.152*** -0.141*** -0.175***
Ownership Percentage Values
Institution 0.000 0.0007*
Bank -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
Financial 0.002* 0.002** 0.001
Mutual / Pension Fund 0.001* 0.001* 0.000
Insurance 0.000 0.000 0.001
Private Equity 0.0007** 0.000
Family 0.0005* 0.0006*
Industrial Company 0.000 0.000
Ownership Count Values
Institution -0.003 -0.003
Bank -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.013**
Financial 0.004 0.004 0.001
Mutual / Pension Fund 0.002 0.002 0.000
Insurance 0.003 0.002 0.008
Private Equity 0.002 0.000
Family 0.006 0.012
Industrial Company -0.013* -0.012
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Control Variables
Ln (Assets) 0.032*** 0.025*** 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.033*** 0.034*** 0.030*** 0.033 0.033*** 0.037***
Dividend Dummy 0.100*** 0.088*** 0.090*** 0.090*** 0.088*** 0.100*** 0.088*** 0.093*** 0.092*** 0.085***
Leverage 0.100** 0.047 0.042 0.037 0.092** 0.091** 0.032 0.026 0.016 0.078*
Multiple Class Dummy -0.039** -0.032 -0.037* -0.030
Blockholder Wedge 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
5 Year % Sales Growth 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001***
Crosslist Dummy -0.063*** -0.061*** -0.062*** -0.063*** -0.058*** -0.061*** -0.059*** -0.057*** -0.057*** -0.055***
Capital Expenditures 0.264*** 0.220*** 0.227*** 0.230*** 0.270*** 0.233*** 0.237*** 0.231***
GIC Dummy Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 381 567 567 567 382 381 567 567 567 382
R-Square 0.398 0.360 0.365 0.370 0.381 0.400 0.356 0.373 0.379 0.391
Adj R-Sq 0.351 0.329 0.331 0.332 0.322 0.352 0.325 0.339 0.342 0.333
Pr > F <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
Table 5 - Full Sample OLS Regressions: This table reports the results from the ordinary least squares regressions that estimate the impact of ownership structure  
performance measures: Tobin's Q, GIC Industry-Adjusted Q, and Return on Assets (ROA). Tobin's Q is (Market Value of Equity + Book Value of Short Term Debt + Book Value of 
Long Term Debt)/Book Value of Assets. GIC Industry-Adjusted Q is Tobin's Q divided by the GIC industry average Tobin's Q, where the GIC average is determined using a 
sample of 1161 Canadian Firms from Compustat. ROA is Operating Income Before Depriciation / Total Assets. Ln(Assets) is the natural logarithm of total assets. Dividend 
Dummy takes on a value of 1 when dividends are issued and 0 otherwise. Leverage is (Short Term Debt + Long Term Debt) / Assets. Multiple Class Dummy takes on a value of 
1 if multiple classes of shares are traded. Blockholder Wedge is the difference in control rights and cash flow rights for blockholders greater than 10%. Crosslist Dummy takes 
on a value of 1 if shares are listed in the United States and 0 otherwise. Capital Expenditures is scaled by assets. Ownership Percentage values equal the total ownership 
percentage for a category of owner. Ownership count values equal the number of owners for a category of ownership. Institution is the sum of Bank, Financial, 
Mutual/Pension Fund, and Insurance. The inclusion of industry dummies is indicated by a Yes or No although results are not shown. *, **, and *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
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Table 6 - Sub-Sample OLS Regressions- Firms with Family Ownership Greater than 20%
Panel A
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Dependent Variable: Q
Parameter Estimates
Intercept -0.060 1.229*** 1.481*** 1.693** -0.087 -0.114 1.288*** 1.185*** 0.841** 0.078
Ownership Percentage Values
Institution -0.006 -0.001
Bank 0.014 0.016 0.008
Financial -0.017 -0.013 0.006
Mutual / Pension Fund 0.000 -0.003 -0.013
Insurance -0.008 -0.007 0.039
Private Equity 0.018 -0.063
Family 0.001 0.003
Industrial Company -0.014 -0.026
Ownership Count Values
Institution -0.004 0.041
Bank 0.106 0.113 0.086
Financial 0.089 0.084 0.116
Mutual / Pension Fund 0.018 0.030 -0.149
Insurance -0.117 -0.105 0.053
Private Equity 0.135 0.126
Family 0.147* 0.076
Industrial Company -0.005 -0.096
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Control Variables
Ln (Assets) 0.148 0.072 0.071 0.072 0.218 0.161 0.039 0.057 0.038 0.142
Dividend Dummy 0.161 0.029 0.010 -0.009 0.047 0.165 0.017 0.050 0.013 0.188
Leverage -1.994** -1.292* -1.211 -1.054 -1.895** -2.025** -1.194* -1.325* -1.199 -2.334***
Multiple Class Dummy 0.282 0.127 0.267 0.366
Blockholder Wedge -0.003 -0.002 0.000 -0.001 -0.012 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.006 -0.012
5 Year % Sales Growth 0.024 -0.004 0.018 -0.015
Crosslist Dummy -0.014 0.033 0.081 0.062 -0.024 -0.067 -0.026 -0.037 -0.011 0.019
Capital Expenditures 2.322** 1.806* 2.040* 1.870* 2.177* 1.335 1.242 1.179
GIC Dummy Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 49 70 70 70 49 49 70 70 70 49
R-Square 0.331 0.230 0.247 0.268 0.349 0.325 0.241 0.266 0.300 0.383
Adj R-Sq -0.235 -0.106 -0.155 -0.202 -0.488 -0.246 -0.092 -0.125 -0.150 -0.411
Pr > F 0.898 0.827 0.900 0.937 0.983 0.908 0.788 0.844 0.867 0.962
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Panel B
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Dependent Variable:                                     
GIC Industry-Adjusted Q
Parameter Estimates
Intercept 0.211 0.525** 0.5264** 0.301 -0.088 0.156 0.573*** 0.575*** 0.406* 0.113
Ownership Percentage Values
Institution -0.002 0.000
Bank 0.004 0.003 0.003
Financial -0.003 -0.003 0.012
Mutual / Pension Fund 0.002 -0.002 -0.003
Insurance -0.003 -0.003 0.015
Private Equity 0.027 -0.014
Family 0.005 0.003
Industrial Company 0.001 -0.009
Ownership Count Values
Institution 0.019 0.047
Bank 0.040 0.031 0.033
Financial 0.123 0.129* 0.109
Mutual / Pension Fund 0.051 0.054 -0.056
Insurance -0.094 -0.099 0.030
Private Equity 0.089 0.056
Family 0.082 -0.009
Industrial Company 0.044 -0.014
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Control Variables
Ln (Assets) 0.129* 0.054 0.053 0.033 0.187** 0.128* 0.024 0.029 0.014 0.150**
Dividend Dummy 0.172 0.129 0.130 0.102 0.093 0.171 0.130 0.174 0.158 0.159
Leverage -1.219 -0.471 -0.456 -0.166 -1.269* -1.223* -0.415 -0.566 -0.449 -1.414**.
Multiple Class Dummy 0.236 0.144 0.223 0.240
Blockholder Wedge -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 -0.008 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006
5 Year % Sales Growth -0.003 -0.007 -0.008 -0.016
Crosslist Dummy -0.127 -0.024 -0.019 0.006 -0.128 -0.155 -0.080 -0.083 -0.069 -0.093
Capital Expenditures 1.165* 0.662 0.624 1.006 0.872 0.134 -0.068 0.049
GIC Dummy Controls NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Observations 49 70 70 70 49 49 70 70 70 49
R-Square 0.239 0.048 0.052 0.106 0.234 0.242 0.081 0.116 0.143 0.300
Adj R-Sq 0.063 -0.059 -0.109 -0.101 -0.081 0.068 -0.023 -0.034 -0.055 0.011
Pr > F 0.240 0.869 0.972 0.907 0.718 0.227 0.607 0.656 0.735 0.441
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Panel C
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Dependent Variable: ROA
Parameter Estimates
Intercept -0.006 0.058 0.117** 0.172*** 0.018 0.093* -0.009 0.110* 0.122* 0.006
Ownership Percentage Values
Institution 0.000 0.001
Bank 0.002 0.001 0.002
Financial -0.003 -0.003** 0.000
Mutual / Pension Fund 0.002** 0.000 0.002
Insurance -0.002 -0.003** -0.005*
Private Equity 0.011*** 0.017***
Family 0.000 0.000
Industrial Company 0.000 -0.003*
Ownership Count Values
Institution 0.008 -0.004
Bank 0.014 0.015 0.012
Financial -0.006 -0.007 -0.018
Mutual / Pension Fund 0.016* 0.016 0.006
Insurance 0.002 0.002 -0.005
Private Equity 0.015 0.013
Family 0.004 0.014
Industrial Company -0.019 -0.035***
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Control Variables
Ln (Assets) 0.002 0.004 0.005 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.006 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003
Dividend Dummy 0.091*** 0.065*** 0.067*** 0.065*** 0.086*** 0.063*** 0.090*** 0.064*** 0.063*** 0.078***
Leverage 0.182*. 0.067 0.083 0.169*. 0.193**. 0.088 0.172**. 0.110* 0.116* 0.167*
Multiple Class Dummy -0.059* -0.068* -0.060* -0.053
Blockholder Wedge 0.001** 0.001 0.001 0.002** 0.002** 0.000 0.002** 0.001 0.001 0.001
5 Year % Sales Growth -0.004 -0.002 -0.004 0.000
Crosslist Dummy -0.113*** -0.081*** -0.073*** -0.060** -0.125*** -0.090*** -0.108*** -0.088*** -0.082*** -0.107***
Capital Expenditures 0.271* 0.219 0.244* 0.273** 0.157 0.294* 0.176 0.131
GIC Dummy Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 49 70 70 70 49 70 49 70 70 49
R-Square 0.746 0.564 0.601 0.703 0.800 0.575 0.749 0.593 0.613 0.784
Adj R-Sq 0.531 0.374 0.388 0.512 0.542 0.389 0.537 0.375 0.365 0.507
Pr > F 0.002 0.001 0.001 <.0001 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.009
Table 6 -This table reports the results from the ordinary least squares regressions that estimate the impact of ownership structure  performance measures: 
Tobin's Q, GIC Industry-Adjusted Q, and Return on Assets (ROA). Tobin's Q is (Market Value of Equity + Book Value of Short Term Debt + Book Value of Long Term 
Debt)/Book Value of Assets. GIC Industry-Adjusted Q is Tobin's Q divided by the GIC industry average Tobin's Q, where the GIC average is determined using a 
sample of 1161 Canadian Firms from Compustat. ROA is Operating Income Before Depriciation / Total Assets. Ln(Assets) is the natural logarithm of total assets. 
Dividend Dummy takes on a value of 1 when dividends are issued and 0 otherwise. Leverage is (Short Term Debt + Long Term Debt) / Assets. Multiple Class 
Dummy takes on a value of 1 if multiple classes of shares are traded. Blockholder Wedge is the difference in control rights and cash flow rights for blockholders 
greater than 10%. Crosslist Dummy takes on a value of 1 if shares are listed in the United States and 0 otherwise. Capital Expenditures is scaled by assets. 
Ownership Percentage values equal the total ownership percentage for a category of owner. Ownership count values equal the number of owners for a category 
of ownership. Institution is the sum of Bank, Financial, Mutual/Pension Fund, and Insurance. The inclusion of industry dummies is indicated by a Yes or No 
although results are not shown. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
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Table 7 - Sub-Sample OLS Regressions- Firms with Institutional Ownership Greater than 20%
Panel A
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Dependent Variable: Q
Parameter Estimates
Intercept 2.130*** 2.072*** 2.082*** 2.129*** 2.123*** 1.570*** 1.510*** 1.700*** 1.336*** 1.785***
Ownership Percentage Values
Institution -0.005 -0.004
Bank 0.005 0.003 0.001
Financial -0.003 -0.004 0.001
Mutual / Pension Fund -0.006 -0.007 -0.009*
Insurance -0.008* -0.008* -0.006
Private Equity -0.005** -0.009
Family -0.001 -0.008*
Industrial Company -0.003 -0.003
Ownership Count Values
Institution 0.061 0.085***
Bank 0.147*** 0.172*** 0.104*
Financial 0.137** 0.171*** 0.190**
Mutual / Pension Fund 0.020 0.042 -0.022
Insurance 0.058 0.095 0.027
Private Equity -0.002 -0.045
Family 0.121 -0.026
Industrial Company 0.142** 0.074
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Control Variables
Ln (Assets) -0.130** -0.140*** -0.146*** -0.148*** -0.150*** -0.160*** -0.177*** -0.207*** -0.205*** -0.214***
Dividend Dummy 0.212 0.290** 0.254** 0.252** 0.210 0.221 0.278** 0.238** 0.261** 0.228
Leverage -0.937** -0.481 -0.568 -0.558 -0.974** -0.888** -0.460 -0.528 -0.440 -0.812*
Multiple Class Dummy -0.205 -0.233* -0.244* -0.248*
Blockholder Wedge -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.006** -0.004 -0.003 -0.006** -0.005** -0.004 -0.005* -0.005
5 Year % Sales Growth 0.010*** 0.011** 0.011** 0.011***
Crosslist Dummy 0.280** 0.364*** 0.361*** 0.342*** 0.266* 0.301** 0.360*** 0.361*** 0.355*** 0.382***
Capital Expenditures -0.269 0.473 0.470 0.389 -0.286 0.304 0.217 0.194
GIC Dummy Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 199 306 306 306 200 199 306 306 306 200
R-Square 0.354 0.232 0.239 0.245 0.374 0.359 0.248 0.272 0.288 0.407
Adj R-Sq 0.248 0.160 0.159 0.156 0.250 0.253 0.178 0.195 0.204 0.289
Pr > F <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
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Panel B
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Dependent Variable: GIC Industry-Adjusted Q
Parameter Estimates
Intercept 1.319*** 1.190*** 1.120*** 1.240*** 1.369*** 1.084*** 0.900*** 1.003*** 0.876*** 1.175***
Ownership Percentage Values
Institution -0.003 -0.003*
Bank 0.003 0.002 -0.001
Financial -0.003 -0.003 0.000
Mutual / Pension Fund -0.004 -0.004* -0.005*
Insurance -0.006** -0.006** -0.008
Private Equity -0.003** -0.005*
Family -0.001 -0.003
Industrial Company -0.001 -0.001
Ownership Count Values
Institution 0.026 0.043**
Bank 0.080*** 0.088*** 0.052
Financial 0.072** 0.086*** 0.101**
Mutual / Pension Fund 0.009 0.017 -0.015
Insurance 0.015 0.034 -0.017
Private Equity -0.016 -0.052
Family 0.056 -0.006
Industrial Company 0.062 0.049
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Control Variables
Ln (Assets) -0.060* -0.065*** -0.069*** -0.069*** -0.064** -0.073** -0.084*** -0.100*** -0.100*** -0.101***
Dividend Dummy 0.121 0.206*** 0.189*** 0.181*** 0.112 0.119 0.196*** 0.186*** 0.193*** 0.134
Leverage -0.239 -0.152 -0.165 -0.170 -0.224 -0.215 -0.133 -0.148 -0.091 -0.104
Multiple Class Dummy -0.080 -0.087 -0.089 -0.100
Blockholder Wedge -0.004** -0.003** -0.002* -0.002 -0.002 -0.003** -0.002* -0.001 -0.002 -0.003
5 Year % Sales Growth 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Crosslist Dummy 0.110 0.162** 0.151** 0.148** 0.106 0.121 0.153** 0.143** 0.133** 0.139*
Capital Expenditures -0.018 0.365 0.345 0.321 0.008 0.306 0.262 0.238
GIC Dummy Controls NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Observations 199 306 306 306 200 199 306 306 306 200
R-Square 0.074 0.069 0.079 0.084 0.096 0.074 0.081 0.109 0.122 0.145
Adj R-Sq 0.030 0.047 0.047 0.043 0.028 0.030 0.059 0.079 0.083 0.080
Pr > F 0.095 0.003 0.007 0.017 0.153 0.099 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.008
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Panel C
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Dependent Variable: ROA
Parameter Estimates
Intercept -0.229*** -0.156*** -0.158*** -0.165*** -0.197*** -0.237*** -0.0926** -0.117** -0.124** -0.274***
Ownership Percentage Values
Institution 0.000 0.001*
Bank 0.000 0.000 -0.001
Financial 0.002* 0.002* 0.000
Mutual / Pension Fund 0.001* 0.001* 0.000
Insurance 0.000 0.000 0.000
Private Equity 0.0009*** 0.001
Family 0.001 0.001**
Industrial Company 0.000 0.000
Ownership Count Values
Institution 0.001 -0.004
Bank -0.017** -0.016* -0.005
Financial 0.000 0.000 0.000
Mutual / Pension Fund 0.003 0.004 0.011
Insurance -0.006 -0.005 0.012
Private Equity 0.004 0.011
Family 0.008 0.015
Industrial Company -0.004 0.004
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Control Variables
Ln (Assets) 0.033*** 0.023*** 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.035*** 0.033*** 0.025*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.038***
Dividend Dummy 0.113*** 0.090*** 0.091*** 0.092*** 0.099*** 0.113*** 0.090*** 0.099*** 0.098*** 0.102***
Leverage 0.112* 0.034 0.034 0.030 0.098* 0.112* 0.036 0.042 0.037 0.103*
Multiple Class Dummy -0.009 0.002 -0.009 -0.004
Blockholder Wedge 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
5 Year % Sales Growth 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000
Crosslist Dummy -0.090*** -0.064*** -0.066*** -0.064*** -0.085*** -0.090*** -0.068*** -0.065*** -0.066*** -0.091***
Capital Expenditures 0.295*** 0.217** 0.225** 0.232*** 0.294*** 0.217** 0.236** 0.225**
GIC Dummy Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 199 306 306 306 200 199 306 306 306 200
R-Square 0.446 0.345 0.349 0.355 0.418 0.446 0.335 0.349 0.351 0.428
Adj R-Sq 0.355 0.284 0.281 0.279 0.302 0.355 0.274 0.281 0.275 0.314
Pr > F <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
Table 7 - Sub-Sample OLS Regressions- Firms with Institutional Ownership Greater than 20%: This table reports the results from the ordinary least squares regressions 
that estimate the impact of ownership structure  performance measures: Tobin's Q, GIC Industry-Adjusted Q, and Return on Assets (ROA). Tobin's Q is (Market Value 
of Equity + Book Value of Short Term Debt + Book Value of Long Term Debt)/Book Value of Assets. GIC Industry-Adjusted Q is Tobin's Q divided by the GIC industry 
average Tobin's Q, where the GIC average is determined using a sample of 1161 Canadian Firms from Compustat. ROA is Operating Income Before Depriciation / Total 
Assets. Ln(Assets) is the natural logarithm of total assets. Dividend Dummy takes on a value of 1 when dividends are issued and 0 otherwise. Leverage is (Short Term 
Debt + Long Term Debt) / Assets. Multiple Class Dummy takes on a value of 1 if multiple classes of shares are traded. Blockholder Wedge is the difference in control 
rights and cash flow rights for blockholders greater than 10%. Crosslist Dummy takes on a value of 1 if shares are listed in the United States and 0 otherwise. Capital 
Expenditures is scaled by assets. Ownership Percentage values equal the total ownership percentage for a category of owner. Ownership count values equal the 
number of owners for a category of ownership. Institution is the sum of Bank, Financial, Mutual/Pension Fund, and Insurance. The inclusion of industry dummies is 
indicated by a Yes or No although results are not shown. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
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Table 8 - Full Sample 2 SLS Regressions
Panel A
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Dependent Variable: Q
Parameter Estimates
Intercept -2.620 1.621 1.649*** 1.697*** 1.298*** 0.814 1.100 0.874 7.086 5.756 0.447 2.01*** 1.975*** 1.464***
Ownership Percentage Values
Institution 0.253 -0.003
Bank 0.068 0.040 0.078
Financial 0.259 0.186 0.223
Mutual / Pension Fund -0.503 -0.375 0.066
Insurance -0.135 -0.101 -0.192
Private Equity
Family -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002
Industrial Company -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 -0.002 -0.004 -0.001
Control Variables
Ln (Assets) -0.758 -0.120 -0.206** -0.176* -0.160 -0.306 -0.257 -0.256 0.022 -0.018 -0.109* -0.029 -0.055 0.030
Dividend Dummy 0.201 0.35*** 0.273* 0.319** 0.251 0.129 0.203 0.067 -0.774 -0.476 0.407* 0.293* 0.319** 0.329*
Leverage 1.704 -0.747 -0.537 -0.639* -0.633 -0.886 -0.864 -0.590 -4.042 -3.222 -0.370 -1.109** -1.038** -0.955**
Multiple Class Dummy -0.242 -0.263* -0.248 -0.265 -0.246
Blockholder Wedge
5 Year % Sales Growth 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
Crosslist Dummy 0.310 0.411*** 0.408*** 0.382*** 0.291** 0.412 0.387* 0.301 0.415 0.389 0.304* 0.416*** 0.39*** 0.305*
Capital Expenditures 0.509 0.724 0.702 0.678 0.706 0.681 0.717 0.689 0.721 0.691
GIC Dummy Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 381.000 567.000 567.000 567.000 382.000 567.000 567.000 382.000 567.000 567.000 382.000 567.000 567.000 382.000
R-Square 0.017 0.196 0.179 0.195 0.202 0.043 0.070 0.074 0.007 0.013 0.155 0.145 0.168 0.165
Adj R-Sq -0.058 0.159 0.141 0.155 0.139 -0.001 0.024 0.000 -0.039 -0.036 0.088 0.105 0.127 0.098
Pr > F 1.000 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.505 0.051 0.461 1.000 1.000 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
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Panel B
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Dependent Variable: Q
Parameter Estimates
Intercept 1.59*** 1.095** 1.605*** 1.661*** 1.636*** 1.587*** 2.046* 5.177 1.617*** 1.435 6.557 1.586*** 1.663*** 1.401***
Ownership Count Values
Institution -0.013 0.046
Bank 0.049 0.470 0.708
Financial -0.060 -0.574 -4.513
Mutual / Pension Fund -0.023 0.041 -1.781
Insurance -0.262 -0.384 -0.458
Private Equity
Family 0.127 0.061 -0.141 -1.226 0.017 -0.502 -0.031 -0.130
Industrial Company 0.098 0.140 -0.090 -0.548 0.016 -0.236 -0.024 -0.013
Control Variables
Ln (Assets) -0.119** -0.122* -0.148** -0.289** -0.356* -0.118** -0.034 0.662 -0.128*** -0.131*** -0.018 -0.087 -0.072 -0.029
Dividend Dummy 0.35*** 0.322** 0.346*** 0.29** 0.344** 0.346*** 0.292 0.617 0.342** 0.372 -0.353 0.418*** 0.449*** 0.455**
Leverage -0.739** -0.629 -0.664** -0.226 -0.111 -0.727** -0.959 -3.105 -0.72** -0.675 -2.375 -0.891** -0.993** -1.079**
Multiple Class Dummy -0.271** -0.27* -0.273 -0.276 -0.282**
Blockholder Wedge
5 Year % Sales Growth 0.005* 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
Crosslist Dummy 0.412*** 0.302** 0.41*** 0.411*** 0.316** 0.412*** 0.409*** 0.335 0.412*** 0.411*** 0.336 0.412*** 0.41*** 0.312**
Capital Expenditures 0.719 0.513 0.724 0.698 0.716 0.705 0.722 0.720 0.700 0.697
GIC Dummy Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 567.000 381.000 567.000 567.000 382.000 567.000 567.000 382.000 567.000 567.000 382.000 567.000 567.000 382.000
R-Square 0.195 0.239 0.199 0.184 0.172 0.192 0.131 0.010 0.196 0.196 0.034 0.190 0.183 0.213
Adj R-Sq 0.157 0.180 0.162 0.143 0.107 0.155 0.087 -0.069 0.159 0.156 -0.043 0.152 0.142 0.150
Pr > F <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 1.000 <.0001 <.0001 0.994 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
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Panel C
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Dependent Variable: GIC_ADJ_Q
Parameter Estimates
Intercept 0.969*** 1.093*** 0.959*** 0.978*** 0.971*** 0.998*** 1.013*** 1.006*** 1.08*** 1.09*** 0.91*** 0.965*** 1.022*** 0.952***
Ownership Percentage Values
Institution -0.004 -0.011
Bank -0.007 -0.009 -0.006
Financial -0.007 -0.007 -0.011
Mpfund -0.013 -0.012 0.007
Insurance -0.028 -0.029 -0.055**
Private Equity
Family 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001
Industrial Company -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.000
Control Variables
Ln (Assets) -0.022 -0.027 -0.046* -0.045* -0.022 -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.021 -0.052*** -0.052*** -0.029 -0.036 -0.015 0.002
Dividend Dummy 0.24*** 0.253*** 0.262*** 0.266*** 0.209*** 0.261*** 0.264*** 0.221*** 0.236*** 0.24*** 0.208*** 0.252*** 0.209*** 0.217***
Leverage -0.418** -0.459** -0.335** -0.352** -0.407** -0.309** -0.32** -0.407** -0.371** -0.378** -0.363* -0.395** -0.5*** -0.493**
Multiple Class Dummy -0.125 -0.122 -0.124 -0.118 -0.136*
Blockholder Wedge
5 Year % Sales Growth 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Crosslist Dummy 0.155** 0.199*** 0.199*** 0.19*** 0.162** 0.195*** 0.187*** 0.162** 0.197*** 0.189*** 0.164** 0.19*** 0.162**
Capital Expenditures 0.442* 0.507** 0.544** 0.539** 0.52** 0.515** 0.527** 0.522** 0.484** 0.549**
GIC Dummy Controls NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Observations 381.000 567.000 567.000 567.000 382.000 567.000 567.000 382.000 567.000 567.000 382.000 567.000 567.000 382.000
R-Square 0.058 0.057 0.058 0.059 0.050 0.058 0.060 0.050 0.057 0.059 0.049 0.060 0.045 0.057
Adj R-Sq 0.037 0.047 0.048 0.046 0.027 0.048 0.046 0.027 0.047 0.045 0.026 0.049 0.033 0.034
Pr > F 0.005 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.023 <.0001 <.0001 0.025 <.0001 <.0001 0.025 <.0001 0.001 0.009
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Panel D
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Dependent Variable: GIC_ADJ_Q
Parameter Estimates
Intercept 1.03*** 0.931*** 0.973*** 0.956*** 0.964*** 1.013*** 0.998*** 1.024*** 1.121*** 1.198*** 0.934*** 0.96*** 1.003*** 1.022***
Ownership Count Values
Institution -0.034 -0.005
Bank 0.006 0.025 0.124
Financial -0.021 -0.046 -0.082
Mpfund -0.086 -0.118 0.006
Insurance -0.224** -0.277** -0.288**
Private Equity
Family 0.005 -0.012 -0.013 -0.058 -0.031 -0.038 -0.035 -0.073*
Industrial Company 0.024 0.054* 0.013 0.030 0.008 0.041 -0.010 0.013
Control Variables
Ln (Assets) -0.027 -0.027 -0.057** -0.063** -0.076** -0.028 -0.047** -0.019 -0.048** -0.048** -0.031 -0.022 -0.018 0.002
Dividend Dummy 0.246*** 0.233*** 0.256*** 0.258*** 0.229*** 0.201*** 0.253*** 0.228*** 0.222*** 0.213*** 0.217*** 0.313*** 0.329*** 0.325***
Leverage -0.404** -0.386* -0.296* -0.259 -0.224 -0.411*** -0.316* -0.377* -0.345** -0.349** -0.316 -0.495*** -0.542*** -0.596**
Multiple Class Dummy -0.119 -0.134* -0.133* -0.132* -0.15*
Blockholder Wedge
5 Year % Sales Growth 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Crosslist Dummy 0.206*** 0.154** 0.194*** 0.192*** 0.158** 0.198*** 0.173** 0.199*** 0.198*** 0.169** 0.204*** 0.203*** 0.172**
Capital Expenditures 0.535** 0.457* 0.529** 0.51** 0.612** 0.516** 0.547** 0.554** 0.47* 0.467*
GIC Dummy Controls NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO
Observations 567.000 381.000 567.000 567.000 382.000 567.000 567.000 382.000 567.000 567.000 382.000 567.000 567.000 382.000
R-Square 0.057 0.057 0.058 0.060 0.063 0.038 0.057 0.053 0.059 0.058 0.057 0.061 0.061 0.062
Adj R-Sq 0.047 0.037 0.048 0.047 0.041 0.029 0.044 0.030 0.049 0.045 0.034 0.051 0.047 0.039
Pr > F <.0001 0.005 <.0001 <.0001 0.003 0.001 <.0001 0.015 <.0001 <.0001 0.009 <.0001 <.0001 0.004
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Panel E
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Dependent Variable: ROA
Parameter Estimates
Intercept -0.071 0.015 -0.141*** -0.14*** -0.173*** -0.136 -0.130 -0.162** 0.038 0.004 -0.100 -0.116* -0.119* -0.179***
Ownership Percentage Values
Institution -0.008 -0.009
Bank -0.006 -0.007 0.001
Financial 0.001 -0.001 -0.006
Mpfund -0.016 -0.013 -0.006
Insurance -0.005 -0.005 0.006
Private Equity
Family 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0
Industrial Company 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0
Control Variables
Ln (Assets) 0.053 0.054 0.034** 0.035** 0.031* 0.027 0.029 0.037** 0.032 0.032 0.035*** 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.029**
Dividend Dummy 0.104*** 0.082*** 0.095*** 0.096*** 0.089*** 0.087*** 0.089*** 0.096*** 0.053 0.060 0.081*** 0.086*** 0.086*** 0.089***
Leverage 0.021 -0.069 0.023 0.019 0.095 0.038 0.037 0.088 -0.066 -0.047 0.058 0.022 0.023 0.099*
Multiple Class Dummy -0.039 -0.034* -0.034 -0.034 -0.035*
Blockholder Wedge
5 Year % Sales Growth 0.001* 0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.001**
Crosslist Dummy -0.063*** -0.061*** -0.061*** -0.063*** -0.058*** -0.062*** -0.063*** -0.058*** -0.062** -0.063*** -0.059*** -0.062*** -0.063*** -0.058***
Capital Expenditures 0.262*** 0.228** 0.226*** 0.223*** 0.224*** 0.222*** 0.224** 0.222** 0.224*** 0.222***
GIC Dummy Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 381.000 567.000 567.000 567.000 382.000 567.000 567.000 382.000 567.000 567.000 382.000 567.000 567.000 382.000
R-Square 0.272 0.179 0.343 0.342 0.377 0.356 0.353 0.350 0.156 0.194 0.337 0.344 0.349 0.372
Adj R-Sq 0.216 0.141 0.313 0.309 0.327 0.326 0.321 0.298 0.117 0.153 0.285 0.314 0.317 0.322
Pr > F <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
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Panel F
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Dependent Variable: ROA
Parameter Estimates
Intercept -0.131*** -0.189*** -0.137*** -0.131*** -0.174** -0.135*** -0.204 -0.314 -0.078 0.018 -0.384 -0.136*** -0.133*** -0.166**
Ownership Count Values
Institution -0.002 -0.001
Bank -0.003 -0.013 -0.014
Financial 0.002 0.087 0.170
Mpfund -0.026 -0.056 0.073
Insurance 0.019 0.018 0.001
Private Equity
Family 0.006 0.011 0.032 0.056 -0.005 0.031 0.011 0.014
Industrial Company -0.013 -0.014 0.005 0.010 -0.015 -0.001 -0.009 -0.012
Control Variables
Ln (Assets) 0.029*** 0.033*** 0.029*** 0.032* 0.038 0.027*** 0.014 0.005 0.029*** 0.031*** 0.03** 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.033***
Dividend Dummy 0.088*** 0.1*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 0.087*** 0.088*** 0.096*** 0.076 0.076*** 0.061 0.115 0.083*** 0.082*** 0.087***
Leverage 0.034 0.095* 0.035 0.018 0.070 0.039 0.070 0.172 0.025 -0.003 0.150 0.051 0.045 0.083
Multiple Class Dummy -0.038* -0.031 -0.032 -0.032 -0.031
Blockholder Wedge
5 Year % Sales Growth 0.001** 0.001** 0.001 0.001** 0.001**
Crosslist Dummy -0.062*** -0.063*** -0.062*** -0.062*** -0.059*** -0.062*** -0.061*** -0.059* -0.061*** -0.061*** -0.06** -0.062*** -0.062*** -0.059***
Capital Expenditures 0.224*** 0.262*** 0.224*** 0.219*** 0.224*** 0.221*** 0.223*** 0.221*** 0.226*** 0.219***
GIC Dummy Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 567.000 381.000 567.000 567.000 382.000 567.000 567.000 382.000 567.000 567.000 382.000 567.000 567.000 382.000
R-Square 0.355 0.399 0.357 0.366 0.385 0.355 0.277 0.183 0.336 0.288 0.283 0.353 0.359 0.383
Adj R-Sq 0.325 0.353 0.327 0.334 0.336 0.325 0.240 0.118 0.305 0.252 0.227 0.324 0.327 0.334
Pr > F <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
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Table 8 - Full Sample 2 SLS Regressions: This table reports the results from the 2-Stage Least Squares regressions that estimate the impact of ownership 
structure  performance measures: Tobin's Q, GIC Industry-Adjusted Q, and Return on Assets (ROA). Tobin's Q is (Market Value of Equity + Book Value of Short 
Term Debt + Book Value of Long Term Debt)/Book Value of Assets. GIC Industry-Adjusted Q is Tobin's Q divided by the GIC industry average Tobin's Q, where 
the GIC average is determined using a sample of 1161 Canadian Firms from Compustat. ROA is Operating Income Before Depriciation / Total Assets. Ln(Assets) 
is the natural logarithm of total assets. Dividend Dummy takes on a value of 1 when dividends are issued and 0 otherwise. Leverage is (Short Term Debt + Long 
Term Debt) / Assets. Multiple Class Dummy takes on a value of 1 if multiple classes of shares are traded. Blockholder Wedge is the difference in control rights 
and cash flow rights for blockholders greater than 10%. Crosslist Dummy takes on a value of 1 if shares are listed in the United States and 0 otherwise. Capital 
Expenditures is scaled by assets. Ownership Percentage values equal the total ownership percentage for a category of owner. Ownership count values equal 
the number of owners for a category of ownership. Institution is the sum of Bank, Financial, Mutual/Pension Fund, and Insurance. Institution, Bank, Financial, 
Mutual/Pension Fund, and Insurance levels of ownership are estimated endogenously within the 2 SLS simultaneous equations system. The inclusion of 
industry dummies is indicated by a Yes or No although results are not shown. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
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Table 9- Full Sample 2 SLS Regression Results: Equation 6
Panel A: Percent Measures 
of Ownership
Dependent Variable Institution Institution Bank Bank Financial Financial
Mutual 
/Pension 
Fund
Mutual 
/Pension 
Fund
Insurance Insurance
Parameter Estimates
Intercept 2.227 1.341 -4.903** -3.359 -0.326 -2.293 6.733* 7.446* 0.978 -0.498
Control Variables
Ln(Assets) 3.028*** 2.717*** 1.39*** 1.076*** 0.698** 0.921*** 0.278 0.351 0.641*** 0.386**
Dividend -0.963 0.511 0.607 0.692 0.601 0.642 -1.805 -1.202 -0.307 0.372
Leverage -9.217* -5.405 -2.612 -1.569 1.375 0.867 -4.233 -3.21 -3.883** -1.284
Blockholder Wedge 0.049 0.057 -0.031 -0.016 -0.002 0.006 0.028 0.017 0.053** 0.049**
Crosslist -1.371 -1.983 -0.137 -0.397 -0.403 -1.645* -0.119 -0.978 -0.726 0.911*
Quebec -1.129 0.7 -1.328 -1.248 0.563 0.254 0.066 1.873 -0.392 -0.204
Performance Measures
Q 4.486** 5.062** 1.906** 1.941** 1.964* 2.803** 0.987 0.208 -0.486 0.114
Industry-Adjusted Q
ROA
Observations 567 381 567 382 567 382 567 382 567 382
R-Square 0.064 0.067 0.122 0.083 0.022 0.048 0.014 0.008 0.052 0.066
Adj R-Square 0.052 0.05 0.111 0.066 0.01 0.031 0.001 -0.01 0.04 0.049
Pr > F <.0001 0.0005 <.0001 <.0001 0.0792 0.0093 0.3628 0.865 <.0001 0.0005
  
78 
 
Panel B: Count Measures of 
Ownership
Dependent Variable Institution Institution Bank Bank Financial Financial
Mutual 
/Pension 
Fund
Mutual 
/Pension 
Fund
Insurance Insurance
Parameter Estimates 0.819 1.662** -1.261*** -0.879** -0.016 -0.062 2.429*** 2.78*** -0.332 -0.191
Intercept
0.75*** 0.672*** 0.402*** 0.381*** 0.185*** 0.187*** 0.005 -0.014 0.158*** 0.123***
Control Variables -0.098 0.319 0.044 -0.018 -0.084 0.136 -0.252 -0.14 0.195** 0.348***
Ln(Assets) -2.157*** -2.352*** -0.586 -0.431 -0.151 -0.183 -0.744 -0.949 -0.675*** -0.731**
Dividend -0.003 -0.003 -0.013** -0.013* 0.002 0.003 -0.004 -0.004 0.011*** 0.01**
Leverage 0.923*** 0.845*** 0.365*** 0.303** 0.183 0.019 0.398*** 0.44** -0.022 0.046
Blockholder Wedge -0.179 -0.019 -0.151 -0.016 0.053 -0.137 -0.227 -0.019 0.145 0.131
Crosslist
Quebec
Performance Measures
Q 0.404 0.168 0.328** 0.189 0.275* 0.35** -0.329* -0.482** 0.129 0.115
Industry-Adjusted Q
ROA
Observations 567 381 567 382 567 382 567 382 567 382
R-Square 0.28 0.25 0.274 0.231 0.075 0.087 0.039 0.033 0.181 0.174
Adj R-Square 0.271 0.236 0.265 0.217 0.063 0.07 0.027 0.015 0.171 0.159
Pr > F <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0024 0.0767 <.0001 <.0001
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Panel C: Percent Measures 
of Ownership
Dependent Variable Institution Institution Bank Bank Financial Financial
Mutual 
/Pension 
Fund
Mutual 
/Pension 
Fund
Insurance Insurance
Parameter Estimates
Intercept 14.248** 20.919*** -0.546 1.268 4.845 7.414** 10.672** 6.001 1.709 3.328
Control Variables
Ln(Assets) 2.261*** 2.353*** 1.186*** 0.903*** 0.669** 0.413 0.134 0.345 0.363** 0.612***
Dividend 1.748 1.194 0.928 1.119 1.329 1.472 -1.359 -1.451 0.691 0.186
Leverage -14.096** -18.553*** -5.07*** -4.711** -3.927 -2.526 -6.214* -2.456 -2.557* -4.713***
Blockholder Wedge -0.019 -0.02 -0.048* -0.043 -0.036 -0.03 0.013 0.026 0.036 0.046*
Crosslist -1.073 -0.546 0.204 -0.05 -1.145 -0.043 0.062 -0.941 0.931* -0.803
Quebec 1.814 -0.639 -1.129 -0.83 0.866 0.776 0.173 1.875 -0.138 -0.434
Performance Measures
Q
Industry-Adjusted Q -2.909 -9.19 -0.464 -0.791 -1.604 -3.598 -1.854 1.879 -2.004 -3.203
ROA
Observations 381 567 567 382 382 567 567 382 382 567
R-Square 0.061 0.06 0.12 0.077 0.036 0.019 0.013 0.009 0.069 0.052
Adj R-Square 0.044 0.048 0.109 0.06 0.018 0.006 0.001 -0.01 0.052 0.04
Pr > F 0.0012 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0563 0.1569 0.3779 0.8475 0.0003 <.0001
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Panel D: Count Measures of 
Ownership
Dependent Variable Institution Institution Bank Bank Financial Financial
Mutual 
/Pension 
Fund
Mutual 
/Pension 
Fund
Insurance Insurance
Parameter Estimates
Intercept 2.485*** 3.13*** -0.93* -0.837* 0.82* 0.804* 1.956*** 2.554*** 0.502 0.702**
Control Variables
Ln(Assets) 0.654*** 0.675*** 0.377*** 0.367*** 0.156*** 0.151*** 0.027 0.02 0.11*** 0.127***
Dividend 0.42 0.201 0.03 -0.038 0.22 -0.006 -0.197 -0.162 0.437*** 0.339***
Leverage -2.864*** -3.262*** -0.833** -0.507 -0.777* -0.586 -0.351 -0.69 -1.152*** -1.153***
Blockholder Wedge -0.008 -0.011 -0.014*** -0.013* -0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.004 0.006 0.008**
Crosslist 0.875*** 0.999*** 0.422*** 0.337** 0.081 0.232** 0.354** 0.341** 0.066 0.003
Quebec 0.027 -0.133 -0.117 0.016 -0.06 0.083 -0.115 -0.259 0.165 0.161
Performance Measures
Q
Industry-Adjusted Q -0.497 -1.431 0.321 0.338 -0.192 -0.25 -0.132 -0.762 -0.471* -0.74**
ROA
Observations 381 567 567 382 382 567 382 567 382 567
R-Square 0.235 0.229 0.271 0.231 0.07 0.064 0.025 0.036 0.163 0.146
Adj R-Square 0.221 0.22 0.262 0.217 0.053 0.052 0.006 0.024 0.147 0.136
Pr > F <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0003 <.0001 0.2275 0.0048 <.0001 <.0001
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Panel E: Percent Measures 
of Ownership
Dependent Variable Institution Institution Bank Bank Financial Financial
Mutual 
/Pension 
Fund
Mutual 
/Pension 
Fund
Insurance Insurance
Parameter Estimates
Intercept 13.33*** 12.209*** 0.083 -1.375 3.94** 4.235*** 7.655*** 8.365*** 1.451 1.058
Control Variables
Ln(Assets) 1.92*** 2.404*** 0.982*** 1.266*** 0.555 0.387 0.37 0.252 0.061 0.479**
Dividend -0.151 -1.175 1.301 1.158 0.582 0.335 -1.017 -1.342 -0.894 -1.33*
Leverage -13.457*** -14.686*** -4.073** -4.801*** -3.369 -1.056 -3.401 -5.33* -2.287 -3.511**
Blockholder Wedge -0.006 0.012 -0.037 -0.046* -0.028 -0.018 0.015 0.02 0.043* 0.056**
Crosslist -0.817 -0.469 -0.1 0.162 -1.06 0.014 -0.966 0.013 1.146** -0.686
Quebec 1.713 -0.781 -0.838 -1.082 0.816 0.689 1.92 0.22 -0.22 -0.589
Performance Measures
Q
Industry-Adjusted Q
ROA 14.396 7.854 -2.969 -3.131 5 5.185 -1.495 -3.412 12.679*** 9.7**
Observations 381 567 382 567 382 567 382 567 382 567
R-Square 0.062 0.062 0.078 0.121 0.037 0.019 0.009 0.013 0.077 0.056
Adj R-Square 0.045 0.051 0.061 0.11 0.019 0.006 -0.01 0.001 0.06 0.044
Pr > F 0.0011 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0482 0.1578 0.8642 0.3892 <.0001 <.0001
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Panel F: Count Measures of 
Ownership
Dependent Variable Institution Institution Bank Bank Financial Financial
Mutual 
/Pension 
Fund
Mutual 
/Pension 
Fund
Insurance Insurance
Parameter Estimates
Intercept 1.677*** 2.282*** -0.793*** -0.863*** 0.554*** 0.722*** 2.023*** 1.93*** 0.055 0.267
Control Variables
Ln(Assets) 0.702*** 0.605*** 0.418*** 0.422*** 0.155*** 0.14*** -0.008 0.005 0.12*** 0.071**
Dividend -0.08 0.13 0.228 0.326** -0.059 0.123 -0.363 -0.447** 0.099 0.194
Leverage -2.641*** -2.731*** -0.553 -0.923*** -0.479 -0.715* -0.374 -0.388 -0.852*** -1.003***
Blockholder Wedge -0.006 -0.006 -0.014** -0.015*** 0 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.01*** 0.008**
Crosslist 0.999*** 0.913*** 0.301** 0.391*** 0.233** 0.093 0.379** 0.359** 0.016 0.095
Quebec -0.142 0.01 -0.08 0.081 -0.067 -0.123 -0.285 0.142 0.15
Performance Measures
Q
Industry-Adjusted Q
ROA 0.337 2.116 -2.13* -2.431** 0.096 0.676 1.448 1.542 1.13* 1.694**
Observations 567 381 382 567 567 382 382 567 567 382
R-Square 0.269 0.242 0.231 0.272 0.067 0.073 0.026 0.038 0.181 0.173
Adj R-Square 0.26 0.228 0.217 0.263 0.055 0.056 0.008 0.026 0.171 0.158
Pr > F <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0002 0.1832 0.0031 <.0001 <.0001
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Table 9 - Full Sample 2 SLS Regressions: This table reports the results from the 2-Stage Least Squares regressions that estimate the impact of performance 
measures on ownership structure: Tobin's Q, GIC Industry-Adjusted Q, and Return on Assets (ROA). Tobin's Q is (Market Value of Equity + Book Value of Short 
Term Debt + Book Value of Long Term Debt)/Book Value of Assets. GIC Industry-Adjusted Q is Tobin's Q divided by the GIC industry average Tobin's Q, where 
the GIC average is determined using a sample of 1161 Canadian Firms from Compustat. ROA is Operating Income Before Depriciation / Total Assets. Ln(Assets) 
is the natural logarithm of total assets. Dividend Dummy takes on a value of 1 when dividends are issued and 0 otherwise. Leverage is (Short Term Debt + Long 
Term Debt) / Assets. Multiple Class Dummy takes on a value of 1 if multiple classes of shares are traded. Blockholder Wedge is the difference in control rights 
and cash flow rights for blockholders greater than 10%. Crosslist Dummy takes on a value of 1 if shares are listed in the United States and 0 otherwise. Capital 
Expenditures is scaled by assets. Ownership Percentage values equal the total ownership percentage for a category of owner. Ownership count values equal 
the number of owners for a category of ownership. Institution is the sum of Bank, Financial, Mutual/Pension Fund, and Insurance. Institution, Bank, Financial, 
Mutual/Pension Fund, and Insurance levels of ownership are estimated endogenously within the 2 SLS simultaneous equations system. The inclusion of 
industry dummies is indicated by a Yes or No although results are not shown. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels.
 
 
